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DEAF PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW: 
COMPELLING A CONVERSATION ABOUT 
COMMUNICATION 
MICHAEL A. SCHWARTZ∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) grants people 
with disabilities access to public accommodations, including the of-
fices of medical providers, equal to that enjoyed by persons without 
disabilities. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has unequivocally de-
clared that the law requires effective communication between the med-
ical provider and the Deaf patient. Because most medical providers 
are not fluent in sign language, the DOJ has recognized that effective 
communication calls for the use of appropriate auxiliary aids, includ-
ing sign language interpreters. The final decision on what to offer the 
Deaf patient is the doctor’s, and under current DOJ regulations, the 
doctor does not have to consult with the patient or give “primary con-
sideration” to the patient’s choice of auxiliary aid as long as what the 
doctor offers results in effective communication. However, given the 
great variation in people’s communication styles and skills, a stan-
dard, one-size-fits-all auxiliary aid would fail to achieve effective 
communication in many cases, harming not only the Deaf patient, but 
also the medical provider, who would be potentially liable for violat-
ing the ADA as well as hamstrung in getting accurate information for 
purposes of diagnosis and treatment. Moreover, most doctors are not 
savvy about Deafness and Deaf culture. Thus, the best way to ensure 
effective communication would be to require the medical provider to 
ask the Deaf patient for his or her choice of auxiliary aid and to give 
“primary consideration” to the patient’s expressed choice of auxiliary 
aid. Such an approach is required under Title II of the ADA, which 
makes it mandatory for state and local governments to consult with 
people with disabilities and give “primary consideration” to the pa-
tient’s choice of auxiliary aid. Given that there is no difference be-
tween a public doctor and a private doctor that would justify the two 
different approaches and that cost is not a factor, since under either 
title, a medical provider cannot pass on the costs to the person with a 
disability, the DOJ should revise its interpretation of Title III in order 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Michael Schwartz, an Assistant Professor of Law, is director of the Disability 
Rights Clinic at Syracuse University College of Law, Syracuse, New York. A former Assis-
tant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Bureau of the New York State Department of 
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Disabilities Act. Schwartz happens to be Deaf—fluent in American Sign Language and a 
full-fledged member of the Deaf community of the United States. 
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to bring it into line with its interpretation of Title II. To fail to do so 
would operate to frustrate both the letter and the spirit of the ADA. 
Until the DOJ brings the titles into line, the courts should decline to 
give controlling weight to the DOJ’s interpretation of Title III. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Up to two million Deaf people in the United States use sign lan-
guage to communicate,1 but when they need to see a doctor, they find 
that many medical offices and hospitals are “aurally inaccessible,” 
that is, they lack appropriate auxiliary aids for Deaf patients.2 Case 
                                                                                                                     
 1. HARLAN LANE ET AL., A JOURNEY INTO THE DEAF-WORLD 42 (1996); JEROME D. 
SCHEIN, AT HOME AMONG STRANGERS (1989). But see CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, 
INSIDE DEAF CULTURE 9 (2005) (positing the maximum number of signing Deaf people, in-
cluding Canadians, at 300,000). This Author chooses the convention of capitalizing the 
word, “deaf,” to underline the political act of naming. To be “Deaf” is to claim membership 
in a cultural and linguistic minority as opposed to the popular idea of “deafness” as a medi-
cal condition. See PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra, at 1-2. This Author also uses the word, 
“Deaf,” as shorthand: it includes those who are hard-of-hearing. 
 2. “Aurally inaccessible” is this Author’s term to describe offices that are not 
equipped to meet the communication needs of patients who cannot hear or understand the 
spoken word and who use sign language to communicate with the world. In other words, 
not only are these offices lacking sign language interpreters, computer-aided real-time 
transcription (CART) technology, captioned material, and other visual methods for convey-
ing information; the personnel in these offices know very little about Deafness, Deaf cul-
ture, and the communication needs of Deaf patients. See Lisa M. Harmer, Health Care De-
livery and Deaf People: Practice, Problems, and Recommendations for Change, 4 J. DEAF 
STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 73 (1999). As exemplified by the story of James Boardman, infra Part 
I.D, Deaf people’s experiences with the lack of communication access in their doctors’ of-
fices points to the need for cultural competence on the part of doctors in their dealings with 
Deaf patients. Aurally inaccessible offices are also culturally incompetent offices, and this 
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law is replete with stories about Deaf people encountering medical 
providers who are aurally inaccessible to them because the providers 
did not furnish a sign language interpreter or other appropriate aux-
iliary aid to facilitate communication between the Deaf person 
(whether a patient or a relative) and the provider.3 To address this 
problem, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), inter-
pretive regulations of the ADA by the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ), and judicial case law offer guidance on providing an 
appropriate auxiliary aid for Deaf patients in the medical setting. 
The guiding lodestone is the principle of effective communication,4 
and numerous approaches—interpreters, computer-aided real-time 
transcription (CART) technology, written notes, and captioning—are 
listed as some of the ways to achieve that end.5  
 There is just one glitch. 
 The DOJ’s “section-by-section analysis” of 28 C.F.R. Section 
36.303, the auxiliary aid regulation promulgated under the ADA to 
require places of public accommodation to provide effective communi-
cation,6 does not require the doctor to consult with the Deaf patient, 
                                                                                                                     
Article’s central argument is that one way to ensure a minimal level of cultural competence 
is to require a compulsory conversation between doctor and patient as to what is needed to 
establish effective communication between the two parties.  
 3. See, e.g., Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 95 CV 4549 SJ, 2007 WL 
805802 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007); Connors v. W. Orange Healthcare Dist., No. 
605CV647ORL31KRS, 2005 WL 1500899 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2005); Constance v. State 
Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 166 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Majocha v. Turner, 
166 F. Supp. 2d 316 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Freydel v. N.Y. Hosp., No. 97 Civ. 7926(SHS), 2000 
WL 10264 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2000); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 791 (S.D. Ohio 
1999); Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 186 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 58 F. Supp. 2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Falls v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., No. 
Civ.A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999); Proctor v. Prince George’s 
Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24 (D. Md. 1998); Naiman v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 
95 CIV. 6469(LMM), 1997 WL 249970 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997); Schroedel v. N.Y. Univ. 
Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp. 594, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); People by Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. 
Group, P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 
1164 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994).   
 4. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (2007) (“A public accommodation shall furnish appropriate 
auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with indi-
viduals with disabilities” (emphasis added)). 
 5. Id. § 36.303(b). The DOJ defines “auxiliary aids and services [as] a wide range of 
services and devices for ensuring effective communication,” but cautions that the “[u]se of 
the most advanced technology is not required so long as effective communication is en-
sured.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B, § 36.303 Auxiliary Aids and Services (published July 26, 
1991). The DOJ “wishes to clarify that the list [of auxiliary aids] is not an all-inclusive or 
exhaustive catalogue of possible or available auxiliary aids or services. It is not possible to 
provide an exhaustive list, and such an attempt would omit new devices that will become 
available with emerging technology.” Id.  
 6. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B, § 36.303 (revised as of July 1, 1994). A doctor’s office 
is included in the twelve categories of public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) 
(2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(5)(iii) (“Place of public accommodation means a facility, operated 
by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the fol-
lowing categories – (6) . . . professional office of a health care provider.” Id. at (iii)(6).). To 
avoid confusion, this Author will use the term, “doctor’s office,” in lieu of “place of public 
950  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:947 
 
nor to give “primary consideration” to the Deaf patient’s express 
choice of auxiliary aid that would ensure effective communication be-
tween the doctor and the patient.7 While the regulations fleshing out 
the ADA’s requirements obligate a doctor’s office to “take those steps 
that may be necessary to ensure” effective communication, the De-
partment’s analysis of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.303 does not specify that 
one of these steps should require the doctor to consult with the Deaf 
patient prior to deciding on an appropriate auxiliary aid.8 Under the 
ADA, as interpreted by the DOJ, there are no specific enforceable 
steps required of a doctor’s office to ensure effective communication. 
As long as the communication is effective, the choice of auxiliary aid 
or service is entirely up to the doctor.9 
 Instead, what the Department’s analysis merely does is to “strong-
ly encourage” a doctor to consult with a Deaf patient as to what he or 
she needs for effective communication; the Department also refuses 
to require the doctor to give “primary consideration” to the Deaf pa-
tient’s choice.10 Yet, empirical research by this Author demonstrates 
that the great variation of Deaf patients and the complexity of their 
experiences in the medical setting require the careful consideration 
of a panoply of appropriate auxiliary aids in order to establish effec-
                                                                                                                     
accommodation” or “public accommodation” because the terms are interchangeable, and 
because the focus of this Article is on the doctor’s office. By the same token, this Author 
means for the term “doctor’s office” to include hospitals and medical clinics, both of which 
are included in the legal definition of a public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F); 28 
C.F.R. § 36.104. 
 7. What constitutes an effective auxiliary aid is a critical question, and the term 
“primary consideration” arose when people with disabilities urged the DOJ to require plac-
es of public accommodation to consult with people with disabilities as to their preferred 
choice of auxiliary aid and to give “primary consideration” to their choices. A common 
sense interpretation of the term, “primary consideration,” would call on the public accom-
modation, in this case the doctor, to give due deference to the patient’s choice of auxiliary 
aid. The term, “primary consideration,” does not appear in the Title III regulation and in-
terpretive commentary, but does appear in the Title II interpretive commentary. See infra 
note 12. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 
4.3200 (1993 & Supp.), available at http://www.ada.gov/publicat.htm#Anchor-Title-47383 
[hereinafter DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL] (“Public accommodations 
should consult with individuals with disabilities wherever possible to determine what type 
of auxiliary aid is needed to ensure effective communication. In many cases, more than one 
type of auxiliary aid or service may make effective communication possible. While consul-
tation is strongly encouraged, the ultimate decision as to what measures to take to ensure 
effective communication rests in the hands of the public accommodation, provided that the 
method chosen results in effective communication.” (emphasis added)). 
 10. Id; see also 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B, § 36.303 (1994). So instead of adopting man-
datory language requiring the doctor to engage in a consultative process with the Deaf pa-
tient to determine the appropriate auxiliary aid for effective communication, the DOJ’s 
analysis of its ADA-enforcing regulation adopted the exhortatory language, “strongly en-
courage,” that in no way obligates the doctor to consult with a Deaf patient. 36 C.F.R. Pt. 
36, App. B § 36.303. 
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tive communication access.11 The data suggest that the doctor and 
the Deaf patient should not only have a thorough conversation about 
which auxiliary aids would work for both parties under a given set of 
circumstances, the doctor should also be required to give “primary 
consideration” to the Deaf patient’s expressed choice of auxiliary aid. 
This is not a new concept or undertaking for the DOJ: its interpreta-
tion of the ADA’s Title II regulation that governs the provision of 
auxiliary aids by state and local governments requires these public 
entities to consult with disabled people and to give their choice of 
auxiliary aid “primary consideration.”12  
 Thus, this Article proposes that the DOJ amend its interpretation 
of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.303 (Title III) to parallel its interpretation of 
28 C.F.R. Section 35.160 (Title II). Just as doctors working for state 
or local government must have a conversation with the patient as 
part of the doctor’s “steps” in providing effective communication and 
must give “primary consideration” to the patient’s choice, so should 
private doctors. Using qualitative research data on Deaf patients 
dealing with medical personnel,13 this Article explores the insights 
and strategies revealed by these patients in their struggle to meet 
the challenges of working with doctors and nurses in an aurally inac-
cessible environment. This Article follows up with a look at the law of 
effective communication access for Deaf patients in the medical set-
ting by reviewing the ADA’s statutory scheme, the controlling regu-
lations promulgated by the DOJ, and federal case law.14 In contrast-
                                                                                                                     
 11. The research data was developed as part of this Author’s dissertation study for 
which he received a Ph.D. in Education at the Cultural Foundations of Education, which is 
part of the School of Education at Syracuse University. See Michael A. Schwartz, Commu-
nication in the Doctor’s Office: Deaf Patients Talk About Their Physicians (Apr. 10, 2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University) [hereinafter Schwartz Dissertation] 
(on file with author). The term “variation” refers to the wide range of hearing loss and its 
attendant impact on people’s language competency and cultural identity. See Harmer, su-
pra note 2; see generally Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An Interpreter Isn’t Enough: 
Deafness, Language and Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843, 859. 
 12. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (2007). According to the DOJ Manual on Title II, 
“When an auxiliary aid or service is required, the public entity must provide 
an opportunity for individuals with disabilities to request the auxiliary aids 
and services of their choice and must give primary consideration to the choice 
expressed by the individual.  ‘Primary consideration’ means that the public 
entity must honor the choice, unless it can demonstrate that another equally 
effective means of communication is available, or that use of the means cho-
sen would result in a fundamental alteration in the service, program, or ac-
tivity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.”  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 7.1100 (1993 & 
Supp.), [hereinafter DOJ TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL] available 
http://www.ada.gov/publicat.htm#Anchor-Title-49425. 
 13. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 14. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, co-
dified as amended at 29 USC § 701 et seq (2000), the precursor to the ADA, is also included 
in the statutory review because the ADA borrowed heavily from the earlier law. Generally, 
most of the cases selected for review in this Article have had a good outcome in that the 
952  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:947 
 
ing a qualitative look at the relationship between Deaf patients and 
their doctors—the complexity of which calls for a flexible approach to 
providing appropriate auxiliary aids, with what the law requires (or, 
to put it more accurately, does not require)—this Article argues for a 
rewrite of the DOJ’s analysis of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.303 to require a 
two-step process. First, the doctor’s office must consult with the per-
son with a disability, and second, the doctor’s office must give “pri-
mary consideration” to the person’s express request for a particular 
auxiliary aid. This new analysis would comport with the broad vision 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act as enacted and may have the 
potential to reduce the amount of litigation over appropriate auxil-
iary aids by encouraging more communication about communica-
tion.15 Put simply, the law needs to play a greater role in fostering 
that conversation in the medical office, not the courtroom. And, if the 
DOJ declines to engage in such redrafting of its interpretation of Ti-
tle III regulation, the courts should decline to give controlling weight 
to the current interpretation. 
A.   The Problem 
 Hearing impairment, with a prevalence of over nine percent, is 
the sixth most common “chronic condition” in the United States.16 Up 
to two million Deaf people communicate using American Sign Lan-
guage,17 and, as noted, there is enormous variation in Deaf people’s 
ability not only to speak and read lips, but also to read and write 
English fluently.18 On the other side of the equation, an overwhelm-
ing majority of doctors in America do not sign, and most medical per-
sonnel know very little about Deafness, Deaf culture, and the myriad 
                                                                                                                     
judge found in favor of the Deaf patient-plaintiff. See infra Part III.C. The argument is not 
that these cases were wrongly decided—to the contrary, as the DOJ’s regulations indicate, 
see infra Part III.B, for Deaf patients, many, if not most, encounters with medical person-
nel require sign language interpreters. Rather, the argument is that these cases represent 
the tip of the iceberg of communication breakdowns between doctor and patient, which 
might be avoided if the DOJ redrafted its analysis of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.303(c) to require 
physician consultation and primary consideration of the Deaf patient’s express choice of 
auxiliary aid. This argument will be further developed in the remainder of this Article. 
 15. Indeed, it is this Article’s central argument: because controlling regulations on the 
ADA issued by the DOJ merely “strongly encourage” communication about communication, 
federal case law interpreting the ADA reflects a breakdown in communication between 
doctor and patient. See supra note 3. Supporting this central argument are this Author’s 
dissertation interviews, case law, DOJ settlement decrees, scholarly research, and the al-
most twenty years of post-1990 experiences of people with disabilities under the ADA with 
the persistent and pervasive failures of doctors to provide effective communication despite 
the statute. 
 16. Steven Barnett & Peter Franks, Health Care Utilization and Adults Who Are 
Deaf: Relationship with Age at Onset of Deafness, 37 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 105 (2002); 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, PREVALENCE OF SELECTED CHRONIC CONDITIONS: 
UNITED STATES, 1990-1992 (1997). 
 17. See supra note 1.  
 18. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
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ways in which Deaf people communicate.19 Accordingly, an aurally 
inaccessible medical office is an ontological reality for many Deaf pa-
tients.20 Because of limited access to health information, many Deaf 
people are often unable to make informed health care decisions for 
themselves and their families.21 The major barriers are attitudinal 
and communication-related.22 
B.   Attitudinal Barriers 
 Many, if not most, physicians are insufficiently prepared to work 
with Deaf patients whose primary mode of communication is sign 
language.23 They often lack the awareness and knowledge that would 
enable them to provide effective communication access in their of-
fices.24 Indeed, medical personnel hold assumptions, misconceptions, 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Patricia Golden & Marian Ulrich, Deaf Patients’ Access to Care Depends on Staff 
Communication, 52 J. AMER. HOSP. ASS’N 86, 86-90 (1978). Generally speaking, there are 
problems with physician readiness to serve patients with disabilities and a corresponding 
need for greater physician education with respect to the ADA. Ellen W. Grabois et al., Ac-
cessibility of Primary Care Physicians’ Offices for People with Disabilities: An Analysis of 
Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 44 (1999); 
Denise M. Lishner et al., Access to Primary Health Care Among Persons with Disabilities 
in Rural Areas: A Summary of the Literature, 12 J. RURAL HEALTH 45 (1996). There is a 
vast body of literature on Deaf culture. See, e.g., JAN BRANSON & DON MILLER, DAMNED 
FOR THEIR DIFFERENCE: THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEAF PEOPLE AS DISABLED 
(2002); CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CULTURE 
(1988); NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE: HEREDITARY 
DEAFNESS ON MARTHA’S VINEYARD (1985); LANE ET AL., supra note 1; DEAF WORLD: A 
HISTORICAL READER AND PRIMARY SOURCEBOOK (Lois Bragg ed., 2001). 
 20. Harmer, supra note 2.  
 21. Steven Barnett, Communication with Deaf and Hard-of-hearing People: A Guide 
for Medical Education, 77 ACAD. MED. 694, 694-700 (2002); see Harmer, supra note 2. 
 22. E.E. McNeil, Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Deaf Persons and the Communication 
Methods Used with Their Deaf Patients (1984), microformed on Dissertation Abstracts Int’l 
45:5, 1306A (Univ. Microforms No. AAC 8418170). 
 23. Barnett, supra note 21. Very few medical schools train their students in working 
with Deaf patients; a bright spot is the University of Rochester School of Medicine where 
the Deaf Wellness Center offers training on how to work with Deaf patients. See Univer-
sity of Rochester Medical Center’s Deaf Wellness Center, 
http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/dwc/index.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). Dr. Robert Q. 
Pollard of the Deaf Wellness Center has initiated at the University of Rochester School of 
Medicine “a first-year medical student seminar organized around direct, non-clinical con-
versation with persons who have disabilities, following the exposure method thought to be 
most effective in improving beliefs and attitudes about disability.” Robert Q. Pollard, A 
Consumer Interview Seminar that Enhances Medical Student Attitudes Toward Persons 
with Disabilities, 5 J. BEHAV. SCI. IN MED. EDUC. 27, 27-31 (1998). In addition, the Univer-
sity of Rochester School of Medicine adopted a unique role-reversal exercise, “Deaf Strong 
Hospital,” for first-year medical students in which the students were “patients” in a simu-
lated health-care setting in which the “health-care professionals” were volunteers from the 
local Deaf community in Rochester. Such an exercise “was designed to teach the first-year 
students about techniques for overcoming communication barriers as well as some of the 
specific challenges in communicating with deaf or hard-of-hearing patients.” Julie Richards 
et al., Deaf Strong Hospital: An Exercise in Cross-Cultural Communication for First Year 
Medical Students, 10 J. U. ROCHESTER MED. CENTER 5 (1999).  
 24. Barnett, supra note 21, at 694; Golden & Ulrich, supra note 19, at 86.  
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and faulty information about Deaf people and Deafness that impact 
the delivery of health care to Deaf patients.25 Many doctors share a 
common social attitude toward Deafness: Deaf people are “dumb” or 
“mute,” and their inability to speak, even their ability to sign, indi-
cates a level of incompetence.26 The problem of attitudinal barriers is 
of acute concern to Deaf patients and their doctors, from both a hu-
man and a legal standpoint. Health care delivery is compromised if 
the two parties cannot communicate adequately and effectively in the 
exchange.27 Furthermore, a doctor’s failure to communicate effec-
tively with a Deaf patient violates federal law.28 
C.   Communication Barriers 
 Many health care professionals labor under several misconcep-
tions.29 For example, they think that lip reading is an effective means 
of communication for every Deaf person,30 that all Deaf people can 
read and write English fluently, and that American Sign Language 
(ASL) is a manual form of the English language.31 For many Deaf 
people, their inability to read and write English fluently impacts 
their ability to read lips.32 ASL, not English, is their native lan-
guage.33 Not only do many Deaf patients struggle with English as a 
dominant language aurally not accessible to them, they confront 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See Glen B. Anderson & Melanie Thornton, Unresolved Issues in the Provision of 
Mental Health Services to People Who Are Deaf, in RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN DEAFNESS: 
ISSUES AND QUESTIONS IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY, AND VOCATIONAL SERVICE PROVISION 
211 (Olga M. Welch ed., 1993); Golden & Ulrich, supra note 19, at 86; Harmer, supra note 
2, at 73-74, 90; Lisa I. Iezzoni et. al, Communicating About Health Care: Observations from 
Persons Who Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 356, 357 (2004). 
 26. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 74.  
 27. Pollard, supra note 23, at 27; Annie G. Steinberg et al., Cultural and Linguistic 
Barriers to Mental Health Service Access: The Deaf Consumer’s Perspective, 155 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 982, 984 (1998).  
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000); 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, Subpart B, §§ 36.201, 36.202, 36.302, 
and 36.303 (2007); see also Barnett, supra note 21, at 694; see, e.g., Majocha v. Turner, 166 
F. Supp. 2d 316 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 
 29. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 19; Harmer, supra note 2, at 93. 
 30. Lip-reading is a difficult skill that not every Deaf or hard-of-hearing person has, 
and even the most skilled lip-readers do not comprehend all of what is said. GROCE, supra 
note 19, at 144 n.3 (1985). 
 31. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 19. Health care professionals are not alone in their 
misperceptions about Deaf people. As numerous authors have pointed out, ignorance and 
misunderstanding of Deaf people and Deaf culture is widespread in American society. See, 
e.g., HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF COMMUNITY (1992); 
DOUGLAS C. BAYNTON, FORBIDDEN SIGNS: AMERICAN CULTURE AND THE CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST SIGN LANGUAGE (1996). 
 32. B.L. Wirfs, Not By Word of Mouth: Communication with Deaf Patients, ASPECTS, 
Summer 1984, at 8; S.L. Davenport, Improving Communication with the Deaf Patient, 4 J. 
OF FAMILY PRACTICE 1065, 1065-68 (1977).  
 33. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 11, at 859. 
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medical personnel who do not understand their struggle.34 For in-
stance, simply putting an interpreter in front of the Deaf patient 
does not automatically render an adequate and effective translation 
of spoken language to ASL or whatever variant of sign language the 
Deaf person understands.35 Interpreters have varying communication 
skills, and not every interpreter is the right person for a particular 
patient in a particular setting.36  
 Even those Deaf patients who are highly literate or well educated 
have to struggle in intense, stressful environments like emergency 
rooms and hospitals to make sense of the information flow; the 
struggle is much more pronounced for those whose first language is 
American Sign Language than it is for those with “normal” hearing 
whose first language is spoken English.37 For a person with hearing, 
medical jargon and terminology can be confusing, even incomprehen-
sible; for a Deaf person, the confusion is compounded by the fact that 
lip-reading involves a great deal of guessing.38 Finally, even when a 
doctor realizes there is a communication problem, federal case law is 
replete with examples of physician resistance to providing an inter-
preter because the doctor is obligated by law to pay for the inter-
preter out of his or her pocket.39 
D.   A True Story Illuminating the Problem 
 In April 1994, James Boardman approached the Civil Rights Bu-
reau of the New York State Department of Law.40 A Deaf patient at 
the Mid Hudson Medical Clinic, a nineteen-doctor medical facility ca-
tering to the Poughkeepsie-Fishkill, N.Y., community, Boardman 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Harmer, supra note 2; Lisa I. Iezzoni et al., Communicating About Health Care: 
Observations from Persons who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
356 (2004).  
 35. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 11; Steinberg et al., supra note 27, at 984 (“Clini-
cians should never assume that the presence of an interpreter ensures adequate communi-
cation.”). 
 36. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 11, at 868-79. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See GROCE, supra note 19. 
 39. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Laurel Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636 (D. Md. 2005); Majocha v. 
Turner, 166 F. Supp. 2d 316 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Falls v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., No. 
Civ.A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999); People by Vacco v. Mid Hudson 
Med. Clinic, 877 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The DOJ explains that “[a]lthough compli-
ance may result in some additional cost, a public accommodation may not place a sur-
charge only on particular individuals with disabilities or groups of individuals with dis-
abilities to cover these expenses.” DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra 
note 9, § 4.1400 (surcharges). 
 40. The Author was the Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Bureau who 
registered Mr. Boardman’s complaint against a medical clinic treating Mr. Boardman and 
his family and initiated the investigation and subsequent lawsuit against the clinic. As 
such, the Author has personal knowledge of the following details in the text pertaining to 
the investigation and prosecution of the claims against the medical clinic. 
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communicated for many years with his doctor by writing notes. Occa-
sionally, when Boardman brought in his young children to see the 
clinic’s pediatrician, the doctor would communicate with the Deaf fa-
ther through the signs of the little children, including one who was 
not older than four years of age.  
 Once the Americans with Disabilities Act became effective in 
1992, Boardman, who also has Usher’s syndrome (a form of retinitis 
pigmentosa, a progressive decrease of visual acuity that may result 
in complete blindness by midlife), decided to request the services of a 
sign language interpreter because he does not speak or read lips.41 
Boardman’s doctor could not understand why after all those years of 
writing notes, his patient suddenly wanted an interpreter and was 
demanding that the doctor pay for the service. The doctor wanted to 
know, “What was this law? Why do I have to pay $60 to $80 for a fif-
teen or thirty minute visit with my deaf patient? The interpreter’s 
bill will nearly swallow up what I earned for the patient’s visit!” No, 
the doctor insisted, Boardman would simply have to live with written 
notes.42   
 For decades since the appearance of the modern doctor, many 
Deaf patients have had difficulty in communicating directly with 
their physicians and other personnel in the doctor’s office.43 Often, 
patients suffer from misdiagnoses, misinformation, incorrect dosages, 
and poor understanding of their health, in large part because the in-
formation from the doctor was either incomprehensible or unavail-
able.44 Oral Deaf folklore is replete with anecdotal evidence of Deaf 
people suffering injury, even death, because the lack of effective 
communication access in an aurally inaccessible office led to confu-
sion and delay.45  
                                                                                                                     
 41. The ADA was signed into law in July 1990, but Title III covering medical offices 
did not become effective until January 26, 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(a) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 
36.508. However, businesses employing twenty-five or fewer employees were given an ad-
ditional six months, and businesses employing ten or fewer employees and having receipts 
of less than $500,000 were given an additional year. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b). The delays gave 
these offices time to adjust to the requirements of the new law. See Civil Rights Division; 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services; 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commer-
cial Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,768 (Sep. 30, 2004),. As of now, the provisions of Title III are 
in full force, applying to all places of public accommodation regardless of size or income. 
 42 These quotes paraphrase what the complainant told the Attorney General’s Office 
the defendant doctor told him every time he requested a sign language interpreter.  
 43. See Harmer, supra note 2; Pollard, supra note 23; Barnett, supra note 21; Stein-
berg et al., supra note 27. 
 44. Elizabeth Ellen Chilton, Ensuring Effective Communication: The Duty of Health 
Care Providers to Supply Sign Language Interpreters for Deaf Patients, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
871 (1996); Annie G. Steinberg et al., Deaf Women: Experiences and Perceptions of Health-
care System Access, 11 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 729 (2002). 
 45. See Steinberg et al., supra note 44, at 730; Carol A. Padden, The Deaf Community 
and the Culture of Deaf People, in AMERICAN DEAF CULTURE: AN ANTHOLOGY 1-16 (Sher-
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 After Boardman signed an official complaint with the Civil Rights 
Bureau, two state police investigators telephoned the medical clinic. 
One investigator pretended to be a father who needed an appoint-
ment with an internist for his sick child; when he obtained the ap-
pointment, he said, “Oh, by the way, my son’s deaf, he’ll need an in-
terpreter.” The clinic responded, “No, we don’t do that.” The second 
investigator called two weeks later, pretending to be the daughter of 
an elderly Deaf woman who needed medical attention, and was also 
denied an interpreter for her “mother.” Both investigators surrepti-
tiously tape-recorded the telephone calls.46 
 The State of New York filed a disability discrimination lawsuit in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, charging the medical clinic with violating Title III of the ADA, 
which affirmatively requires a doctor, as a public accommodation 
provider, to take those “steps as may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated 
or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the 
absence of auxiliary aids and services.”47 The lawsuit demanded that 
the defendant clinic provide Boardman and other Deaf patients with 
appropriate auxiliary aids and services, including qualified sign lan-
guage interpreters.48  
 Pre-trial depositions of the clinic’s doctors demonstrated that not a 
single doctor or staff member understood the needs of Deaf patients 
in their medical practice. They neither consulted with James Board-
man nor considered his requests for an interpreter. Rather, they in-
sisted, heatedly, that Boardman did very well either with written 
notes or through the signing efforts of his minor children. The law-
                                                                                                                     
man Wilcox ed., 1989). The research data consisting of narratives from Deaf interviewees 
collected during this Author’s dissertation study reflected a perception on the part of some 
Deaf patients that the medical setting is a place of dangerous confusion because many doc-
tors offer great resistance in providing sign language interpreters. See Schwartz Disserta-
tion, supra note 11. Case law bears witness to the existence of this perception. See, e.g., 
Constance v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 166 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24 (D.Md. 1998); Aikins v. 
St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994).  
 46. It is a Class E felony under New York state law to overhear or record a telephonic 
or telegraphic communication if one is not the sender or receiver or does not have the con-
sent of either the sender or receiver. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00 (2002); id. § 250.05. “Wire-
tapping” is defined as “the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or tele-
graphic communication by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without the 
consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment.” 
Id. § 250.00. Since the investigators were the initiators and recorders of the two telephone 
calls and consented to the recording of these calls, the Attorney General’s Office was well 
within the parameters of New York law in surreptitiously recording its conversations with 
the medical clinic. 
 47. People by Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 302(b)(2)(A)(iii), 104 
Stat. 327 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). 
 48. People by Vacco, 877 F. Supp. at 144. 
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suit against Mid Hudson Medical Group was settled by consent de-
cree, requiring the clinic to provide qualified interpreters to its Deaf 
patients and to pay a $25,000 fine to New York State.49 
 Although James Boardman’s experience was familiar to many 
members of the Deaf community, qualitative research data consisting 
of numerous interviews with Deaf patients showed that not everyone 
wanted a sign language or oral interpreter when meeting with the 
doctor.50 Some wanted a family member, not a professional inter-
preter, to facilitate communication with the doctor.51 Not every inter-
preter was a good match for a particular Deaf patient, and Deaf pa-
tients themselves had strong preferences for certain interpreters that 
they trusted.52 A few patients were satisfied with writing notes.53 
Some preferred to speak and read lips in direct one-on-one interac-
tions with the doctors.54 A few wanted CART or a similar form of 
computer-based communication.55 As the research revealed, what 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Under G. Oliver Koppel, the Democratic Attorney General, the Civil Rights Bu-
reau demanded $200,000 in damages, but when Dennis Vacco, a Republican, took office, he 
ordered this Author and the bureau to settle for a fraction of what it had demanded.  
 50. Rooted in a social constructivist tradition, see PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS 
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE (1967), and adopting a grounded theory approach, see Kathy Charmaz, 
Grounded Theory, in CONTEMPORARY FIELD RESEARCH: PERSPECTIVES AND FORMULATIONS 
335-52 (Robert M. Emerson ed., 2d ed. 2001), qualitative research aims for “research that 
produces descriptive data—people’s own written or spoken words and observable behav-
ior.” STEVEN J. TAYLOR & ROBERT BOGDAN, INTRODUCTION TO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
METHODS: A GUIDEBOOK AND RESOURCE at 7 (1998). Qualitative research is fast emerging 
as a critical tool in shedding light on the lives of people with disabilities, showing the com-
plex interrelationship among physical impairment and societal barriers. Bonnie O’Day & 
Mary Killeen, Research on the Lives of Persons with Disabilities: The Emerging Importance 
of Qualitative Research Methodologies, 13 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 9, 9-15 (2002). Many 
Deaf people in Rochester reported encounters with doctors that mirrored what James 
Boardman went through prior to his complaint to the Attorney General’s Office. See 
Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. Rochester has one of the largest per capita Deaf 
communities in the United States. See Jamie Berke, Deaf Community – Rochester, NY, 
http://deafness.about.com/cs/culturefeatures3/a/rochester.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).   
 51. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 52. For an excellent discussion of the complexities involved in sign language interpre-
tation, see LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 11, at 868-79. As La Vigne and Vernon point out, 
there is great variation in the Deaf community in terms of language competency, with 
“[t]he majority of deaf individuals fall[ing] into the vast expanse of linguistic territory in 
between fluency in ASL and English and minimal language skill.” Id. at 878.  
 53. Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 54. Id. 
 55. One Deaf person recalled how a doctor in the hospital took him aside and asked 
him if typing at a computer terminal would work as a method of communication. Schwartz 
Dissertation, supra note 11. When the Deaf person said “yes,” they sat down at a computer 
terminal to discuss, via typing, what was happening with the person’s mother, who was 
sick with terminal cancer. Id. The doctor took his time in typing, detailing at great length 
what was happening, what was being done, and the prognosis for the sick patient. Id. The 
doctor did not hurry the Deaf son and patiently answered all his questions. Id. The person 
recalled the doctor’s patience and thoroughness in communicating this way. Id. Because 
the Deaf person was literate in English, this method of communication worked well. Id. 
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was an appropriate auxiliary aid in one instance was not in another 
instance, and figuring out what worked required a grasp of the com-
plexity and nuances in communicating with Deaf patients.56  
 The research data gathered from interviews with Deaf people who 
talked about their experiences with doctors and hospitals demon-
strate the complexity of the medical setting for these patients and 
the variety of responses adopted by the patients as they navigate this 
setting. This data lends support to the idea that doctors must be ob-
ligated to consult with their Deaf patients about appropriate auxil-
iary aids. We now turn to a look at the Deaf narrative of the medical 
setting as bolstering the argument for a compulsory conversation be-
tween doctor and Deaf patient. 
II.   A DEAF PERSPECTIVE ON APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY AIDS 
 Fifteen Deaf people spoke about their experiences with medical 
doctors as part of a qualitative research project exploring the subjec-
tive experiences of Deaf patients in the medical setting.57 While they 
told the usual stories about “bad” doctors who refused to provide in-
terpreters in violation of federal law and who treated the Deaf pa-
tient with condescension and contempt, a more nuanced picture 
emerged. For example, older patients were more tolerant of tradi-
tional methods of communication (notes and lip reading) than young-
er patients; more-educated patients got their communication needs 
accommodated more readily than less-educated ones; and lesser-
educated Deaf patients had more difficulty navigating the system 
and advocating for their needs than better-educated Deaf patients.58 
Despite those results, a few educated, affluent patients recounted 
how their doctors patronized them and treated them as children, 
notwithstanding the patient’s high socioeconomic status.  
 Some Deaf patients expressed ambivalence about the proper role 
of the interpreter in the medical office; some male patients felt em-
barrassed to have a female interpreter, and some patients regarded 
the interpreter as a “machine” with no feelings.59 A number of Deaf 
people indicated their preference for a hoary method of communica-
tion: writing notes.60 One or two preferred to read lips and speak for 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See generally Barnett, supra note 21 (describing the deaf population as heteroge-
neous, with the age of onset of hearing loss having a significant effect on communication 
and socialization, which in turn impacts health services utilization). 
 57. Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 58. This Author found in his research a direct relationship between the interviewee’s 
educational status and his or her understanding of the law. Generally, the more educated 
one was, the better he or she understood what rights under the law meant in the medical 
context. For many Deaf patients, an interpreter or family member serves to mediate the 
exchange between patient and doctor. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 59. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11.  
 60. Id. 
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themselves.61 Some wanted family members to accompany them, 
while others preferred an interpreter or advocate.62 One person 
wanted an interpreter only from out of town, due to concern that lo-
cal interpreters could not be trusted to keep his confidences.63 One 
person preferred lip-reading or the use of CART technology.64 And, on 
the other side of the equation, one or two doctors gladly provided an 
interpreter and paid the bill.65 Indeed, several medical clinics high-
lighted on the Internet their ADA accessibility to Deaf patients.66 The 
nuanced picture that emerged from the study is largely absent from 
the discourse employed by lawyers and judges who grapple with 
what constitutes an appropriate auxiliary aid at a doctor’s office or a 
hospital.67 
 This study started with twin assumptions: all Deaf people wanted 
an interpreter in the medical setting, and all doctors stubbornly re-
sisted that demand. These initial assumptions washed away as soon 
as the Deaf patients started talking, and their narratives quickly 
demonstrated that their experiences with their doctors were complex 
and far more interesting than the superficial, one-dimensional pic-
ture the law has of Deafness and Deaf patients in the medical set-
ting. It was not just that there was variation in people’s need for an 
appropriate auxiliary aid and the doctor’s response to that need. Deaf 
people’s experiences pointed to the need for cultural competence on 
the part of doctors in their dealings with Deaf patients. One way to 
ensure a minimal level of cultural competence is to require a compul-
sory conversation between doctor and patient as to what is needed to 
establish effective communication—indeed, to establish an aurally 
accessible office—between the two parties. 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Sign language interpreters certified by the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf 
(RID), a national certifying organization of interpreters, are bound by a Code of Profes-
sional Conduct, which requires, inter alia, that the interpreter “adhere[s] to standards of 
confidential communication.” NAD-RID CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2005), available 
at http://www.rid.org/UserFiles/File/pdfs/codeofethics.pdf. As the RID explains in its “Guid-
ing Principle” on this issue, “[i]nterpreters hold a position of trust in their role as linguistic 
and cultural facilitators of communication. Confidentiality is highly valued by consumers 
and is essential to protecting all involved.” Id. 
 64. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Sinai – Services and Specialities, http://www.sinai.org/services/deaf-
access/deaf-access.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
 67. See, e.g., Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 186 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (offer-
ing no illustration or explanation how an interpreter would have helped the husband ac-
cess a birthing class); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 796 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (reason-
ing that the defendant did not deny the deaf plaintiffs’ counseling services; rather, the 
plaintiffs “found the services unsatisfactory in the absence of an interpreter.” The court 
does not explain how the absence of the interpreter had no role in denying plaintiffs access 
to defendant’s facility).  
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 The study uncovered a landscape of power and authority, a com-
plex terrain that demands the Deaf patient use a set of sophisticated 
skills for navigation. Much of the work done by these patients in the 
doctor’s office or the hospital is invisible. What now follows is an ef-
fort to delineate the contours of the terrain, to highlight the impact of 
dominant communication practices on Deaf patients, and to render 
visible the invisible work of Deaf patients in the medical setting. The 
key insights of the study bolster the argument for rewriting the 
DOJ’s analysis of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.303 to require a conversation 
between doctor and patient as to the appropriate auxiliary aid for the 
patient and to require “primary consideration” of the patient’s 
choice.68 
A.   The Landscape of Power and Authority 
 The medical setting is a site of power, which underpins the analy-
sis of the relationship between medical personnel and people with 
disabilities.69 Since antiquity, doctors have held themselves out to be 
healers of humankind, and this has led to an authoritarianism that 
is deeply embedded in the practice of medicine.70 Historically, the 
culture of health care has had a strong streak of paternalism, where 
the medical provider, mostly male and white, was presumed to know 
what was best for the patient.71 Today, power in the medical setting 
has three elements: the power to assess, the power to enforce the doc-
tor’s self-interest, and the power to act officially.72 Deaf patients ac-
knowledge this power—very few question or challenge the doctor. 
Rather, they speak of their respect for the doctor’s status as a healer 
with great knowledge. Deaf patients, like many hearing patients, are 
intimidated by the doctor. 
                                                                                                                     
 68. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B, §36.303 (2007). The DOJ entered into a consent 
decree with the Maine Medical Center, infra Part IV.A., where the DOJ required the medi-
cal center to consult with the Deaf patient and makes reference to the patient’s “preferred” 
method of communication. The language of the decree represents recognition by the DOJ 
that consultation is required to determine effectiveness of the communication. 
 69. Sally French & John Swain, The Relationship Between Disabled People and 
Health and Welfare Professionals, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 734 (Gary Al-
brecht et al. eds., 2001). 
 70. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1-29, 85 (1984).  
 71. Gerben DeJong & Ian Basnett, Disability and Health Policy: The Role of Markets 
in the Delivery of Health Services, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 69, at 
610, 624. 
 72. French & Swain, supra note 69; IVAN ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS 15-16 
(1977). Just as women have access to experiences men do not have and do not know about, 
see SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
DISABILITY (1996), Deaf people have access to experience hearing people do not have and 
do not know about. What Deaf patients could bring to the conversation with medical per-
sonnel has the potential to transform the delivery of health care. See Lisa Harmer, Health 
Care Delivery and Deaf People: Practice, Problems, and Recommendations for Change, 4 J. 
Deaf Stud. & Deaf Educ. 73, 103 (1999); Richards et al., supra note 23, at 4-7.  
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 The intimidation factor for Deaf patients, however, is greater giv-
en that the medical model of disability views a patient with a disabil-
ity as being “diseased” and in need of a “fix” or cure.73 Indeed, patho-
logizing difference as disability and asserting control over treatment 
fueled medicine’s rise to power and dominance.74 Conditioned by 
their training, social conventions, and mores to regard disability and 
Deafness as tragic defects in the individual (as opposed to seeing the 
social conventions and mores themselves as disabling), medical doc-
tors see disability and deafness as objects of professional discourse, 
the goal of which is to treat the condition.75 Medical schools reinforce 
this paternalistic view of disability, and with its attendant loss of 
humanity and empathy, the attitude of medical students toward dis-
abled people becomes more negative as their training proceeds.76 
Many providers are inadequately informed and ill equipped to un-
derstand the “particular constellation of health care needs” of their 
disabled patients,77 particularly those who are Deaf or hard-of-
hearing.78 
 One commentator, Ian Basnett, cites Wainapel’s account of “how 
physicians are often negative about disability, seeing inability before 
ability and frustrated by the lack of a prospect of cure and ill-
informed about simple accommodations.”79 This is particularly appli-
cable to Deaf patients. Some doctors see Deaf patients as suffering 
from a deficit and needing the doctor to measure and treat that defi-
cit.80 The phenomenal growth of cochlear implant technology reflects 
the dominant medical view that Deafness is pathology in need of re-
pair and remediation.81  
                                                                                                                     
 73. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A 
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 63 (1993). Doctors work hard to maintain disability as pri-
vate tragedy and to enforce the dependency role of disabled people. French & Swain, supra 
note 69. But this dependency is two-way as well: doctors need disabled patients to make a 
living, and to protect this state of affairs doctors control language, knowledge, and social 
responses to disability. Id. This control dominates how disabled people define themselves, 
shapes their identity as dependent users of medical services, and structures their experi-
ences in the medical setting. Id. 
 74. Irving Kenneth Zola, Healthism and Disabling Medicalization, in DISABLING 
PROFESSIONS 41 (1977). 
 75. LANE, supra note 31, at 212-30.  
 76. Ian Basnett, Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Toward and Decisions 
Affecting Disabled People, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 69, at 450, 
451-52. 
 77. DeJong & Basnett, supra note 71, at 625. 
 78. Barnett, supra note 21, at 694-95. 
 79. Basnett, supra note 76, at 462. 
 80. Cf. Douglas Biklen & Donald N. Cardinal, Reframing the Issue: Presuming Com-
petence, in CONTESTED WORDS, CONTESTED SCIENCES: UNRAVELING THE FACILITATED 
COMMUNICATION CONTROVERSY 187-98 (Douglas Biklen & Donald N. Cardinal eds., 1997). 
 81. LANE, supra note 31, at 216-38. Most Deaf patients do not view deafness as pathol-
ogy. Rather, they see themselves more as a linguistic minority than as disabled people who 
need a fix or cure. See PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 1, at 123-62. 
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 To be sure, everyone, whether deaf or hearing, experiences a pow-
er imbalance when they take off their clothes and put on a skimpy 
gown in a chilly examination room. Everyone is subjected to the same 
rules, practices, and customs that operate in the medical setting. 
Deaf or hearing, many patients lack the education, language compe-
tency, and knowledge to resist, interrogate, and otherwise challenge 
the doctor. Yet, for Deaf patients whose expressive and receptive 
language skills do not conform to the norm of spoken and written 
English, the doctor’s exercise of power and authority is hierarchical 
and unequal,82 “with the professionals holding most of the power. 
Traditionally professional workers have defined, planned and deliv-
ered the services, while disabled people have been passive recipients 
with little if any opportunity to exercise control.”83 Because of the 
language difference, many Deaf patients are “passive recipients” who 
have little opportunity to control what happens to them in the medi-
cal setting. Their communication difficulties with doctors engender 
feelings of frustration and mistrust, which can lead to avoidance of 
health care providers for Deaf patients.84 
 Because Deaf patients generally communicate differently—they 
look and sound different—some medical personnel cannot get past 
the Deafness and consequently lose the ability to respond appropri-
ately.85 This loss is compounded by medicine’s inability to tend to pa-
tients’ decisionmaking needs.86 In one study exploring the relation-
ship between Deaf patients and their doctors, the patients felt that 
their doctors failed to make a sincere effort to understand them when 
the patients described their symptoms; many felt they were treated 
like children and given medication without sufficient information 
and explanation.87 That study highlights the failure of many medical 
                                                                                                                     
 82. This phenomenon is almost always the case, regardless of one’s hearing ability, 
but it is more pronounced for Deaf and hard-of-hearing patients as well as patients with 
other disabilities. Karen Peltz Strauss, Doctor, Can You Check My Vital Signs?, 
GALLAUDET TODAY, 1986 Legal Review, at 7. 
 83. Sally French, Disabled People and Professional Practice, in ON EQUAL TERMS: 
WORKING WITH DISABLED PEOPLE 103 (Sally French ed., 1994). 
 84. Steinberg et al., supra note 44, at 731; Chilton, supra note 44, at 874. 
 85. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 19, at 86. 
 86. KATZ, supra note 70, at 130. 
 87. Alice Nemon, Deaf Persons and Their Doctors, 14 J. REHAB. DEAF 19, 19-20 (1980). 
Indeed, as one author has pointed out, medicine is error-ridden—the processes of diagnos-
ing and treating illness are filled with mistakes—and because these errors unfold as a se-
ries of approximations, doctors need to pay continuous attention to the patient’s condition. 
MARIANNE A. PAGET, THE UNITY OF MISTAKES: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF 
MEDICAL WORK 33 (1988). As Paget describes it, medical work “is a practice of responding 
to the experience of illness . . . its context is a relational encounter between persons about 
the afflictions of the human body and the human spirit.” Id. at 21. Dialogue creates the 
condition of appropriate care where the doctor can tailor the delivery and content of care to 
the needs of the individual patient, and this requires vigilance on the part of the doctor. 
This has ramifications for a medical setting that is wholly aural and communication inac-
cessible for many Deaf patients—forcing these patients to interact on terms not favorable 
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providers to provide “effective communication” as required by law. 
And the findings of this Author’s study drives home the importance 
of requiring the physician to engage in a conversation with the Deaf 
patient about appropriate auxiliary aids that would result in effec-
tive communication between the two. Put simply, an aurally inacces-
sible office does not have to be that way—talking to the Deaf patient 
would go a long way in helping the physician to understand what 
needs to be done to make his or her office aurally accessible. 
 There is an underlying tension between the two parties in the 
medical setting: the doctor sees Deafness as a deviation from the 
norm of “hearing,” while the Deaf patient resists that characteriza-
tion.88 Clearly if a physician regarded Deafness and sign language as 
cultural phenomena worthy of respect and understanding, the com-
munication between doctor and patient would be qualitatively differ-
ent than it is now, with doctors who pathologize Deafness and do not 
understand the communication needs of their Deaf patients. This 
sets the stage for discussion of dominant communication practices 
prevalent in the medical setting.  
B.   Dominant Communication Practices 
 For many Deaf patients, the dominance and prevalence of English 
places them at a disadvantage when communicating with their phy-
sician, because American Sign Language (ASL), not English, is their 
                                                                                                                     
to them holds the potential for tragic error. Cf. id. at 69 (“Mistakes are ‘intrinsic troubles’ 
of discourse in everyday life”).  
 88. The Deaf community shares a sense of culture through American Sign Language, 
which constitutes a continuum of language ranging from traditional sign language to 
Signed English. In addition to sign language, there are traditions, rituals, and other indi-
cia of community that give expression to a feeling of identity with the Deaf world. For a 
fuller exploration of Deaf culture, see DEAFNESS: LIFE AND CULTURE II: A DEAF AMERICAN 
MONOGRAPH(1995). There is a sense of “us” versus “them,” the latter being doctors who 
hold traditional views of Deaf people’s competence. Many of the Deaf interviewees in this 
Author’s doctoral study perceive doctors as holding the view that their patients’ inability to 
speak equals incompetence. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. This sense of alien-
ation is only reinforced when doctors use outdated terminology to refer to their patients: 
“deaf and dumb” or “deaf mute.” Goffman introduced the idea of stigma—how deviation 
from a social norm, whether physical or mental, created a spoiled identity that was stigma-
tized in the eyes of society. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). Thus, managing the body to maximize a positive image and mi-
nimize the negative imagery of others became necessary—it was important to reduce the 
impact of harm to the self that was inflicted by the stigma of spoiled identity. This Author 
echoed some of his Deaf patients in feeling stigmatized by medical personnel—he could see 
it in their eyes and demeanor (“Deaf Man Walking!”). He could sense a number of assump-
tions by doctors—“He is mute, He is less intelligent, He is disabled, indeed defective. In 
short, he is spoiled.” Deaf people experience this stigma in the larger society, where social 
prejudices, biases and assumptions about deafness are reinforced in the educational sys-
tem and the media. Because of a medical school curriculum that perpetuates the idea of 
Deafness as pathology, many doctors and nurses cannot help but reflect the larger social 
thinking about Deafness and Deaf people. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 90-92. 
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native language. Since the vast majority of doctors do not sign, Deaf 
patients are forced to read and write notes in English, and for many, 
this is problematic.89 As recounted by a few Deaf patients in this Au-
thor’s study, the process of writing notes with the doctor was time-
consuming, incomplete, and cursory.90 The laboriousness involved in 
writing under time constraints reduced both parties to brief ques-
tions and answers, and “question and answer is the customary form 
of communicative exchange between powerful and powerless, be-
tween adult and child.”91 In addition, some Deaf patients do not have 
mastery of English:  
When one lacks good English skills, it is very difficult to benefit 
from health education brochures and books, it is harder to read a 
newspaper and gain current health information, it is difficult to 
write and understand notes between the health care provider and 
patient, and it is difficult to read and understand prescription in-
structions, consent forms, and other documents associated with 
health care services.92  
 Some Deaf patients in this Author’s study described doctors as 
hurrying them through their appointments and being impatient with 
the process of paper-and-pen communication.93 They felt disrespected 
and infantilized but were worried about angering the doctor further 
if they insisted on fuller details.94 The doctor clearly did not want to 
take the time to write complex ideas and wait for the response; this 
echoes one commentator’s finding that “[t]he overall impression of 
many informants was that hearing people simply didn’t have the pa-
tience or motivation to work through difficult communication situa-
tions.”95 A negative consequence of this dilemma is that Deaf patients 
will often miss important information about their health.96 Dominant 
communication practices in the medical setting, for many Deaf pa-
tients, reify and reinforce the power imbalance between patient and 
doctor. These practices reinforce the rigid structures of an aurally in-
accessible office. 
 Yet, this Author’s study shows a spectrum of response to the do-
minance of English, ranging from acceptance and accommodation to 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 19, at 86; Steinberg et al., supra note 44, at 730; 
PAUL HIGGINS, OUTSIDERS IN A HEARING WORLD: A SOCIOLOGY OF DEAFNESS 32-33 (1980). 
 90. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 91. ANN ARNETT FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE MAKING OF BLACK 
MASCULINITY 13 (2001). 
 92. Harmer, supra note 2, at 81. 
 93. See Schwartz Dissertation supra note 11. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Susan B. Foster, Communication Experiences of Deaf People: An Ethnographic Ac-
count, in CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE DIVERSITY AND THE DEAF EXPERIENCE 117, 124 (Ila 
Parasnis ed., 1996). 
 96. Id. at 129 (discussing the negative consequences of communcation barriers). 
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resistance, and this spectrum reflects the wide diversity within the 
Deaf community itself.97 The degree of hearing loss varies widely, 
from those who are mildly hard-of-hearing and possess residual hear-
ing and good English reading and writing skills, to those who are 
profoundly deaf. Even among those who are profoundly deaf, English 
language proficiency ranges from poor to excellent.98 There are hard-
of-hearing people with poor English skills, and there are profoundly 
deaf people with excellent English skills. Accordingly, in dealing with 
Deaf patients, doctors cannot and should not fit the patient to a par-
ticular communication method. One size does not fit all.  
 Rather, the doctor needs to tailor the communication method to fit 
the needs of the patient. The best strategy is to offer a panoply of 
visual markers in the environment—interpreters, captioning, com-
munication equipment, and visual aids. The lack of these visual 
markers shapes the socio-spatial experiences outlined in this Au-
thor’s study, even for those accustomed to lip-reading and note tak-
ing, and the absence of an accessible setting reinforces the sense of 
marginality and exclusion many feel. Indeed, the lack of visual 
markers is res ipsa loquitur: it shows a medical office that is aurally 
inaccessible, and that deprives the patient of effective communica-
tion. An aurally inaccessible office violates federal law. 
C.   Rendering the Invisible Visible 
 Much of the work Deaf patients do in the doctor’s office or the 
hospital occurs below the radar. This Author’s study shows that Deaf 
patients engage in an array of unacknowledged strategies.99 For ex-
ample, many are adept at “letting go.” If a Deaf patient is feeling 
healthy or asymptomatic, he or she is more likely to disregard or ig-
nore an instance of communication difficulty with the doctor or 
nurse. If they miss a word, phrase, or sentence on the doctor’s lips, or 
if they do not understand a written word, they will simply nod as if 
they understand and agree. As one patient put it, “If I’m feeling OK, 
I don’t bother to ask for clarification.”100 This Author too understands 
and recognizes this phenomenon: when He is feeling fine, He is less 
likely to probe and work his way through a communication difficulty. 
When He is not feeling well or when He is worried about a potential 
health problem, He will insist that the doctor or nurse either move 
their lips slowly or write down what they say.  
                                                                                                                     
 97. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 98. Michele La Vigne & McCay Vernon, An Interpreter Isn’t Enough: Deafness, Lan-
guage, and Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843, 851-52.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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 Letting go, however, carries within it a kernel of anxiety. The Deaf 
patient wonders: “Am I missing something that might come back to 
haunt me?” There is always a fear that the information the patient is 
not obtaining by “letting go” is exactly the information that is crucial 
to maintaining one’s health. Deaf patients rationalize what they are 
doing by saying the odds of that happening is so slight, and that if 
the doctor really wanted to let them know something was wrong, the 
doctor would make sure the patient understood it the first time it 
was raised.101 But given medicine’s ability to commit errors,102 that is 
not an acceptable rationalization, and Deaf patients know it.  
 Active agency is another strategy. Telling your family and your 
doctor that you do not want a family member mediating or interced-
ing on your behalf in the medical setting requires a volitional act of 
free will. Other examples of active agency and free will by Deaf pa-
tients involve checking out the doctor’s background; educating the 
doctor about the law and about the patient’s communication needs; 
educating oneself about the law and figuring out strategies for con-
veying the information to the doctor; pushing for health-related in-
formation by asking questions; and using the Internet to gather 
background information on one’s health.  
 Part of this agency is the ability to draw on local knowledge: the 
community’s pool of information regarding doctors and the law. For 
instance, some patients ask around in the Deaf community to find a 
doctor who is acknowledged as being sensitive or aware of the needs 
of Deaf patients. Some patients go to Deaf clubs and meetings of Deaf 
people to learn more about laws that impact on the medical setting.103   
 What these insights portray is a competent Deaf patient, notwith-
standing the fact that he or she may not speak. A hearing person 
who is not culturally competent in Deafness fails to see that compe-
tence, and part of that failure is an assumption that a sign language 
interpreter will automatically fix the communication barrier posed by 
the interaction of speaking doctor and signing patient. In many situ-
ations the interpreter is an integral part of facilitating communica-
tion, but it is more complicated than that. Sometimes the patient re-
quires a certain kind of interpreter, and sometimes the patient wants 
something else such as lip-reading or CART. The point is, the evi-
dence derived from this Author’s study shows a complex and nuanced 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id. 
 102. See PAGET, supra note 87. 
 103. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, http://www.nad.org/site/pp.asp?c=foINKQMBF&b=91587 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (the upper left-most tab, “Legal Rights,” offers information on 
captioning, education, employment, government, health care, housing, public facilities, and 
transportation, while the next tab, “Advocacy,” has information on, inter alia, air travel 
and interpreting services). The NAD holds a biennial conference, which offers a forum for 
Deaf people to keep abreast of the latest developments in the law, technology, and other 
matters of concern to the community. 
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story going on every day in medical offices and hospitals where doc-
tors should be talking to these patients about what auxiliary aids for 
communication would be effective for them. 
 This conclusion is supported by another study in which Deaf pa-
tients talked about the potential that inadequate communication 
with their doctors could lead to misdiagnosis and medication errors, 
as well as patient embarrassment, discomfort, and fear.104 Those pa-
tients described not understanding therapeutic regimens, medication 
dosages, or side effects or not knowing what to expect during physical 
exams and procedures.105 The patients suggested outright that doc-
tors ask hearing-impaired patients about their preferred way of 
communicating instead of requiring them to use ineffective ways to 
communicate such as lip-reading (doctors often turn their head or 
lips are hidden by a mask or beard), writing notes, and using family 
members to interpret.106 The patients had a number of useful sugges-
tions for communication access if the law had required doctors to ask. 
These were: (1) Doctors should use interpreters who are trained spe-
cifically for medical settings, and they should speak more slowly to 
hard-of-hearing patients; (2) Doctors should ask patients to repeat 
critical information such as medication instructions, as well as put it 
in writing, in order to avoid potentially dangerous miscommunica-
tion; (3) Doctors should use lights as signals for required actions, 
such as holding one’s breath during a mammogram, and find alterna-
tives to lengthy phone message menus such as e-mail or fax; and (4) 
Medical offices should acquire and train staff to use a teletypewriter 
or telecommunications device for the Deaf, and staff should be 
trained to communicate better with Deaf and hard-of-hearing pa-
tients.107  
                                                                                                                     
 104. See generally Iezzoni et al., supra note 34. Researchers led by Dr. Iezzoni of Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center conducted in-depth interviews with fourteen Deaf and 
twelve hard-of-hearing adults about their communication concerns during medical visits 
and procedures and how communication could be improved. Id. at 356. 
 105. Id. at 359-60. 
 106. Id. at 358. According to the DOJ’s commentary on Title III of the ADA, family 
members and friends should not be called on to interpret for Deaf people. See Part 36 – 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commer-
cial Facilities, app. B, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/reg3a.html#Anchor-Appendix-53283. 
Public comment also revealed that public accommodations have at 
times asked persons who are deaf to provide family members or friends 
to interpret. In certain circumstances, notwithstanding that the family 
member or friend is able to interpret or is a certified interpreter, the 
family member or friend may not be qualified to render the necessary 
interpretation because of factors such as emotional or personal in-
volvement or considerations of confidentiality that may adversely affect 
the ability to interpret ‘effectively, accurately, and impartially’.  
Id. 
 107. Iezzoni et al., supra note 34, at 358-59. 
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 While federal statutory law and controlling regulations clearly de-
fine the kinds of appropriate auxiliary aids and the context in which 
such an auxiliary aid should be made available to the Deaf patient, 
and while the law clearly places on the doctor the responsibility of fi-
guring out an appropriate auxiliary aid to offer the Deaf patient, the 
law seems to be out of sync with what we know about the communi-
cation needs of Deaf patients. The next Section demonstrates that 
the doctor is under no legal compulsion to consult with the patient or 
to give “primary consideration” to the patient’s express choice of aux-
iliary aid. 
III.   THE LEGAL PARADIGM 
A.   Historical Sketch of the Federal Statutory Scheme on Disability 
 In 1973, responding to a long history of discrimination against 
people with disabilities, Congress enacted Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act, “the first national declaration of the rights of people 
with disabilities.”108 Section 504 provided that various federal agen-
cies, acting through the DOJ, could enforce the law against those 
who discriminated on the basis of disability, but the law applied only 
to those entities and organizations that received federal financial as-
sistance.109 Initially, there was no explicit private right of action, but 
in 1978 Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to provide that the 
remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which bars race discrimination, apply with re-
spect to actions brought under Section 504.110 Yet, because the law 
was limited to only those who received federal funding, discrimina-
tion in the wider society was left untouched.111 
                                                                                                                     
 108. BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER & ADAM A. MILANI, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 33 (3d ed. 2004); see also PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
AND POLICY 1-9 (2004). 
 109. TUCKER & MILANI, supra note 108, at 30-31.  
 110. Id. at 32; see 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2000). Initially there was some confusion as to 
whether Section 504, as amended, afforded a private right of action, but in Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001), the Supreme Court held it was “beyond dispute that 
private individuals may sue to enforce,” and in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 
(2002), the Court held that this reasoning applied to Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. 
 111. Section 504’s definition of disability was lifted almost without change from the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920 and was intended to apply to the employment con-
text. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 108, at 1-9. Moreover, even though Section 504 was en-
acted in 1973, it took the Department of Health, Education and Welfare five years to draft 
enforcing regulations, and this was done only after vigorous and widespread protests by 
the disability rights community. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 69 (1993) (excellent survey cover-
ing the history of the disability rights movement in the twentieth century). Finally, Section 
504 reached only those who received federal financial assistance, leaving untouched vast 
swaths of American society—private employers that did not receive such assistance and 
private businesses offering goods and services to the public.  
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 In February 1986, the National Council on Disability (NCD) is-
sued a report titled “Toward Independence: An Assessment of Fed-
eral Laws and Programs Affecting Persons with Disabilities—With 
Legislative Recommendations” (“Toward Independence”).112 The re-
port’s executive summary noted that approximately sixty-six percent 
of working age people with disabilities were not receiving Social Se-
curity or other public assistance income, that federal disability pro-
grams overemphasized income support and underemphasized equal 
opportunity and independence, and that federal programs needed to 
promote equal opportunity and independence for people with dis-
abilities.113 Among its recommended changes to federal disability pol-
icy, the NCD called for a comprehensive law requiring equal oppor-
tunity for people with disabilities.114 In January 1988, the NCD fol-
lowed up with a second report, “On the Threshold of Independence,” 
which contained a proposed bill to implement the NCD’s recommen-
dations.115 
 This initiative led to congressional enactment of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which reached far more actors 
than Section 504, including those who did not receive federal fund-
ing.116 Modeled on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504, the 
ADA is divided into five titles.117 Title I covers employment discrimi-
nation and empowers the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) to promulgate regulations enforcing that title; it also 
gives employees with disabilities a private right of action once they 
have exhausted their administrative remedies with the EEOC and 
received a right to sue letter.118 Title II covers state and local gov-
ernment, establishes a private right of action and the right to injunc-
tive relief, and empowers numerous federal agencies to enforce the 
                                                                                                                     
 112. The report can be obtained from the National Council on Disability’s Web site, 
NCD - Toward Independence 1986, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1986/toward.htm 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008). The National Council on Disability (NCD) is an independent 
federal agency whose fifteen members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. Originally established as an advisory board to the Department of Education under 
the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, the NCD’s “overall purpose . . . is to promote policies, pro-
grams, practices, and procedures that guarantee equal opportunity for all people with dis-
abilities, regardless of the nature or severity of the disability, and to empower them to 
achieve economic self-sufficiency, independent living, and inclusion and integration into all 
aspects of society.” NCD at a Glance, http://www.ncd.gov/brochure_pdfs/brochure.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2008).  
 113. NCD - Toward Independence 1986, supra note 112. 
 114. Id. 
 115. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 108, at 2-7, (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE 
HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE: PROGRESS ON LEGISLATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (Andrea H. Farbman ed., 1988), avail-
able at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1988/pdf/threshold.pdf. 
 116. TUCKER & MILANI, supra note 108, at 68; BLANCK ET AL., supra note 108, at 2-8.  
 117. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 108, at 2-1. 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000). 
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law.119 Title III covers private businesses that offer services and 
goods to the public, adopts the remedies and procedures of Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including a private right of action, and 
empowers the DOJ to promulgate regulations and enforce the law.120 
In short, the ADA is an attempt to fill in the gaps that Section 504 
missed. It is designed to ensure that all people with disabilities have 
the same access to employment, state and local government services, 
and public accommodations, including health care, as that provided 
to people without disabilities. 
B.   Federal Statutory Law on Disability 
 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 lays out the first fed-
eral statutory scheme outlawing discrimination against people with 
disabilities.121 Section 504 reads as follows: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency or by the United States Postal Service.122 
 Under Section 504, the term, “program or activity,” includes “the 
operations of . . . an entire corporation, partnership, or other private 
organization, or an entire sole proprietorship . . . which is principally 
engaged in the business of providing . . . health care.”123  
 The elements of a Section 504 action include the plaintiff’s disabil-
ity, the plaintiff’s qualification to participate in a program or activity, 
the defendant’s status as a recipient of federal financial assistance, 
and a nexus between the complained-of action and the plaintiff’s dis-
ability.124 In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court concluded that 
“[d]iscrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress 
to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of 
                                                                                                                     
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000). For a fuller discussion of the enforcement provisions 
of the various titles of the ADA, see BLANCK ET AL., supra note 108, at 2-26 to 2-28. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)-(b) (2000). 
 121. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, codified as amended 
at 29 USC § 701 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-136, 104 
Stat. 327 (1990). 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). With respect to hospitals and doctors receiving federal 
financial assistance, a qualified individual with a disability is someone “who meets the es-
sential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services.” 42 U.S.C. 12131(2) (2000). 
 123. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)(ii); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785 (S.D. Ohio 
1999).  
 124. Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Doherty v. S. 
Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
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thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.”125 Alexander 
has been interpreted by Courts of Appeals to stand for the proposi-
tion that plaintiffs need not establish intent to discriminate in order 
to prevail on a disparate impact case under Section 504.126  
 Regulations promulgated by the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) specifically address health, wel-
fare, and social services programs and activities receiving federal 
funds.127 The HHS’s Section 504 regulations identify the extent to 
which a recipient of federal funding must accommodate a Deaf pa-
tient in the medical setting:  
A recipient, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, di-
rectly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on 
the basis of handicap: (i) Deny a qualified handicapped person the 
opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or 
service; (ii) Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity 
to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is 
not equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified handi-
capped person with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effec-
tive as that provided to others; (iv) Provide different or separate 
aid, benefits, or services to handicapped persons or to any class of 
handicapped persons unless such action is necessary to provide 
qualified handicapped persons with aid, benefits, or services that 
are as effective as those provided to others.128 
 With respect to auxiliary aids, the HHS regulations state, “A re-
cipient to which this subpart applies that employs fifteen or more 
persons shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to persons with im-
paired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, where necessary to afford 
such persons an equal opportunity to benefit from the service in 
question.”129 Auxiliary aids may include brailled and taped material, 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). 
 126. See, e.g., Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1384 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 127. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(a) (2005) states, “No qualified handicapped person shall, on the 
basis of handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which receives Federal finan-
cial assistance.” 
 128. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (2005). 
 129. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d)(1) (2005). Courts have found this provision applicable to 
health care providers with fifteen or more employees. See, e.g., Bravin v. Mt. Sinai Med. 
Ctr., 186 F.R.D. 293, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds, 58 F. Supp. 2d 
269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) and recognizing that “[i]f the recipient . . . 
employs fifteen or more persons, it ‘shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids’ ”); Proctor v. 
Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826 (D. Md. 1998) (“As a recipient of federal 
funds that employs fifteen or more people, PGHC must also ‘provide appropriate auxiliary 
aids to persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, where necessary to af-
ford such persons an equal opportunity to benefit from the service in question.’ ”); Naiman 
v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 95 CIV. 6469(LMM), 1997 WL 249970, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 
1997) (“If the recipient hospital employs fifteen or more persons, it ‘shall provide appropri-
ate auxiliary aids to persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, where nec-
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interpreters, and other aids for persons with impaired hearing or vi-
sion.130 
 A provider of medical or clinical services with fewer than fifteen 
employees may not be obligated under Section 504 to provide auxil-
iary aids, unless directed to do so by the Health and Human Services 
Director: 
Section 84.52(d) . . . requires recipients with fifteen or more em-
ployees to provide appropriate auxiliary aids for persons with im-
paired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. Further, the Director 
may require a small provider [one with fewer than fifteen employ-
ees] to furnish auxiliary aids where the provision of aids would not 
adversely affect the ability of the recipient to provide its health 
benefits or service. Thus, although a small nonprofit neighborhood 
clinic might not be obligated to have available an interpreter for 
deaf persons, the Director may require provision of such aids as 
may be reasonably available to ensure that qualified handicapped 
persons are not denied appropriate benefits or services because of 
their handicaps.131 
 While Section 504 covers only those doctors and hospitals that re-
ceive federal funding,132 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
is broader, covering doctors, medical clinics, and hospitals, regardless 
of whether they receive federal funding.133 Indeed, unlike Section 
504, the ADA does not require a minimum number of employees.134 
According to the “general rule” of Title III of the ADA “[n]o individual 
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation 
by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 
public accommodation.”135 In terms of statutory construction, the 
general prohibition against discrimination envisions activities of the 
following sort: denial of participation,136 participation in an inte-
                                                                                                                     
essary to afford such persons an equal opportunity to benefit from the service in question.’ 
” (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.552(d)(1))). 
 130. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d). 
 131. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52, Commentary, App. A, Pt. 84, Subpart F.  
 132. 29 U.S.C. §794(a) (2000). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(F) (2000) (the “professional office of a health care provider 
[or] hospital” is considered a public accommodation subject to the ADA if its operations “af-
fect commerce”). Commerce is defined as “travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, 
or communication—(A) among the several States; (2) between any foreign country or any 
territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the same State but through 
another State or foreign country.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1)(A)-(C) (2000). 
 134. Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 788 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (“[N]othing in 28 
C.F.R. § 36.303 excludes from the ADA’s ‘auxiliary aid’ requirement a public accommoda-
tion employing less than 15 workers.”). 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (“It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or 
class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, di-
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grated setting,137 and an opportunity to participate.138 These prohibi-
tions are based on the proscriptions of the earlier Section 504.139 
 Title III’s specific prohibitions against discrimination includes: 
[T]he imposition or application of eligibility criteria that 
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disabil-
ity or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully 
and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria 
can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions being offered[.]140  
It also prohibits discrimination for: 
[A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices or procedures, when such modifications are neces-
sary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabili-
                                                                                                                     
rectly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportu-
nity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(a) 
(2005) (“A public accommodation shall not subject an individual . . . on the basis of a dis-
abili . . . to a denial of the opportunity . . . to participate in or benefit from . . .  a place of 
public accommodation.”). 
 137. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(B) (“Goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a) (2005). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(C) (“Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different 
programs or activities provided in accordance with this section, an individual with a dis-
ability shall not be denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities 
that are not separate or different.”); see also 28 C.F.R. §36.203(b). 
 139. The ADA makes clear that Rehabilitation Act regulations and case law are in-
structive to interpreting the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000). Under the Department of 
Health and Human Services regulations pursuant to Section 504,  
A recipient [of federal funding], in providing any aid, benefit, or service, 
may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrange-
ments, on the basis of handicap: (i) Deny a qualified handicapped per-
son the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or 
service; (ii) Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to 
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not 
equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified handicapped per-
son with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective as that pro-
vided to others; (iv) Provide different or separate aid, benefits, or ser-
vices to handicapped persons or to any class of handicapped persons 
unless such action is necessary to provide qualified handicapped per-
sons with aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those pro-
vided to others. 
45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(i)-(iv) (2005). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i); see also 28 C.F.R. §36.301(a) (“A public accommoda-
tion shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an 
individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and 
equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, 
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered.”). 
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ties, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accom-
modations[.]141 
Finally, Title III has a specific prohibition against discrimination for:  
[A] failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure 
that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied ser-
vices, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other 
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids or ser-
vices, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such 
steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, ser-
vice, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being 
offered or would result in an undue burden.142  
An undue burden means “significant difficulty or expense.”143 The ab-
sence of auxiliary aids or services forms the crux of the case law in-
volving Deaf patients in the medical setting.144 
                                                                                                                     
 141. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also 28 C.F.R. §36.302(a) (“A public accommoda-
tion shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when the 
modifications are necessary to afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). The DOJ regulation echoes the statute: “A public 
accommodation shall take those steps that may be necessary to ensure that no individual 
with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently 
than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the 
public accommodation can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter 
the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations be-
ing offered or would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.” 28 
C.F.R. §36.303(a). The DOJ’s commentary states, “The Department wishes to emphasize 
that public accommodations must take steps necessary to ensure that an individual with a 
disability will not be excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently 
from other individuals because of the use of inappropriate or ineffective auxiliary aids.” 28 
C.F.R. §36.303, App. B; see also DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 
9, §4.3100. As provided in Section 36.303(f), a public accommodation is not required to pro-
vide any particular aid or service that would result either in a fundamental alteration in 
the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of-
fered or in an undue burden. 28 C.F.R. §36.303, App. B. Most courts that have addressed 
the issue of cost “have noted that a reasonable accommodation is both moderate and not 
unduly burdensome.” Bravin v. Mt. Sinai, 186 F.R.D. 293, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing 
Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d at 293; Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  
 143. In determining whether an action would impose an undue burden on a public ac-
commodation, the following factors must be considered: 
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part; (2) The overall fi-
nancial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the number of per-
sons employed at the site; the effect on expenses and resources; legitimate safe-
ty requirements that are necessary for safe operation, including crime preven-
tion measures; or the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the 
site; (3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relation-
ship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity; (4) If 
applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; 
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 In order to establish a prima facie case against a medical office or 
hospital under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff must prove three 
elements: one, that she has a disability; two, that the defendant’s of-
fice is a place of public accommodation; and three, that the defendant 
discriminated against her by engaging in any one of the above-listed 
proscribed activities based on the plaintiff’s disability.145 Intent to 
discriminate is not an additional element of the plaintiff’s ADA 
case.146 It is sufficient to show a set of circumstances that give rise to 
an inference that the denial of the full and equal enjoyment of medi-
cal treatment is based on the plaintiff’s disability.147 
 When the ADA became law in 1990, Congress designated the At-
torney General of the United States as the official responsible for 
promulgating regulations under Title III of the ADA that do not re-
late to the transportation provisions of that title.148 According to the 
DOJ’s regulations, auxiliary aids and services include qualified sign 
language interpreters or other effective means for making aurally-
delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impair-
ments.149 These regulations define a qualified sign language inter-
                                                                                                                     
the overall size of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number 
of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (5) If appli-
cable, the type of operation or operations of any parent corporation or entity, 
including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the par-
ent corporation or entity.  
28 C.F.R. §36.104. 
 144. See supra note 3. There is a requirement in addition to providing auxiliary aids 
and services: removal of communication barriers. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); 28 C.F.R. 
§36.304(a). Communication barriers that are structural in nature (e.g., permanent signage, 
alarm systems, sound buffers, and walls) must be removed only if it is “readily achievable.” 
28 C.F.R. §36.304(a). However, the obligation to remove structural communication barriers 
is independent of any obligation to provide auxiliary aids and services. See 28 C.F.R. 
§36.304(a), App. B. 
 145. Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
 146. Id. at 1166. Because the ADA is similar to Section 504, the analysis of cases aris-
ing under Section 504 applies to the ADA. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2000). Numerous federal agencies share in the responsibility 
of promulgating and enforcing regulations under the ADA, including the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, Department of Transportation (public transportation), 
Federal Communications Commission (telephone relay services), Access Board (design 
guidelines), Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services (health 
care), Department of Labor, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department 
of the Interior (parks and recreation), and Department of Agriculture. See ADA Regula-
tions & Technical Assistance Materials, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/publicat.htm#anchor-
invest%20agencies (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
 149. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b) (2008). 
Examples. The term ‘auxiliary aids and services’ includes – (1) Qualified inter-
preters, notetakers, computer-aided transcription services, written materials, 
telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assistive listening sys-
tems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, open 
and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD’s), vi-
deotext displays, or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materi-
als available to individuals with hearing impairments. 
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preter as an interpreter “who is able to interpret effectively, accu-
rately and impartially both receptively and expressively, using any 
necessary specialized vocabulary.”150 A person who is deaf or hard-of-
hearing cannot be charged for receiving an interpreter or any other 
aid or for the reasonable modification of a policy, practice, or proce-
dure.151 
 The key is effective communication access: “A public accommoda-
tion shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where nec-
essary to ensure effective communication with individuals with dis-
abilities.”152 The auxiliary aid requirement is a flexible one. A public 
accommodation can choose among various alternatives as long as the 
result is effective communication.153 “What constitutes ‘effective 
communication’ is a question of fact . . . .”154 Even if the original aux-
iliary aid or service is too expensive or fundamentally alters the pro-
gram or service of the public accommodation, the public accommoda-
tion is still obligated to provide an alternative auxiliary aid or ser-
vice.155 The public accommodation does not have to provide the per-
                                                                                                                     
Id. Another example of “auxiliary aids and services” is the “[a]cquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(3); see also DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4.3300. According to a Senate committee report, “The 
list is not meant to be exhaustive; rather, it is intended to provide general guidance about 
the nature of the obligation.” S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 161 (1989).  
 150. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007); see also Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 151. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c). 
A public accommodation may not impose a surcharge on a particular individual 
with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs 
of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids, barrier removal, alterna-
tives to barrier removal, and reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures, that are required to provide that individual or group with the non-
discriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part. 
Id. 
 152. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (2007); see also DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4.3200. As the DOJ’s commentary explains, 
Implicit in this duty to provide auxiliary aids and services is the underlying ob-
ligation of a public accommodation to communicate effectively with its custom-
ers, clients, patients, or participants who have disabilities affecting hearing, vi-
sion, or speech . . . . Auxiliary aids and services include a wide range of services 
and devices for ensuring effective communication. Use of the most advanced 
technology is not required so long as effective communication is ensured. 
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303 (2007). Despite the urgings of commenters, the DOJ re-
fused to enumerate the list of possible appropriate accommodations because “such an at-
tempt would omit new devices that will become available with emerging technology.” Id. 
 153. 28 C.F.R § 36.303(c) (2008). For example, a bookstore would not be required to 
provide a sign language interpreter because a notepad and pen would be effective under 
the circumstances. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303. However, were the bookstore to offer 
to the public a lecture by a guest author, it would be obligated to provide an interpreter. Id. 
 154. Bravin v. Mount Sinai, 186 F.R.D. 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Borkowski v. 
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995); Mohamed v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 905 F. 
Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). For this reason, the issue is not appropriately disposed of on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint. See Bravin, 186 F.R.D. at 302.  
 155. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(f). 
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son with a disability with a personal aid or device like a hearing aid, 
a cochlear implant, a prosthetic device, or a cane.156 On the flip side, 
nothing in the law or regulations obligates a person with a disability 
to accept “an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit 
available” offered by the public accommodation.157 
 DOJ regulations define the appropriateness of an auxiliary aid as 
dependent on the length and complexity of the interaction: 
ILLUSTRATION 2a: H goes to his doctor for a biweekly check-up, 
during which the nurse records H’s blood pressure and weight. Ex-
changing notes and using gestures are likely to provide an effec-
tive means of communication at this type of check-up. 
BUT: Upon experiencing symptoms of a mild stroke, H returns to 
his doctor for a thorough examination and a battery of tests and 
requests that an interpreter be provided. H’s doctor should ar-
range for the services of a qualified interpreter, as an interpreter is 
likely to be necessary for effective communication with H, given 
the length and complexity of the communication involved.158 
 Indeed, commentary by the DOJ states, “It is not difficult to imag-
ine a wide range of communications involving areas such as health, 
legal matters, and finances that would be sufficiently lengthy or 
complex to require an interpreter for effective communication.”159  
 Although DOJ regulations and commentary state that doctors 
must take steps to provide appropriate auxiliary aids in order to pro-
vide effective communication, neither states explicitly that the steps 
                                                                                                                     
If provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service by a public accommodation 
would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or in an undue 
burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense, the public accommodation shall 
provide an alternative auxiliary aid or service, if one exists, that would not re-
sult in an alteration or such burden but would nevertheless ensure that, to the 
maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered by the public 
accommodation. 
Id. This is consistent with regulations implementing Section 504 in federally conducted 
programs, which supports the idea that the undue burden of a particular auxiliary aid or 
service does not relieve a public accommodation of its duty to furnish an alternative auxil-
iary aid or service, if available, that would not result in such a burden. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, 
app. B § 36.303. 
 156. 28 C.F.R. § 36.306 (“Personal Devices and Services. This part does not require a 
public accommodation to provide its customers, clients, or participants with personal de-
vices, such as wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as prescription eyeglasses 
or hearing aids; or services of a personal nature including assistance in eating, toileting, or 
dressing.”); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303. 
 157. 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(c).  
 158. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303; see also Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 
F. Supp. 2d 820, 827-28 (D. Md. 1998) (“[C]ourts have focused on specific instances during 
the interaction between the disabled individual and the public accommodation or public 
entity.”). 
 159. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303. 
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include a duty to consult with the deaf patient. And while the regula-
tions are silent on whether a public accommodation must give “pri-
mary consideration” to the disabled person’s request, the DOJ’s 
commentary states outright that public accommodations are not re-
quired to give such consideration to the disabled person’s request.160 
Instead, the public accommodation is merely “strongly encourage[d]” 
to consult with the disabled person.161 
 Put simply, the law allows the doctor to refuse to consult with the 
Deaf patient regarding the appropriateness of a particular auxiliary 
aid and allows him or her not to give “primary consideration” to the 
patient’s express choice of an auxiliary aid. All the law says is that 
“[a] public accommodation shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids 
and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with 
individuals with disabilities.”162 That means that the doctor has to 
get it right or get sued.163 
 Despite the urgings of public commenters who wanted the inclu-
sion of “primary consideration” language,164 the DOJ determined,  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Id. Under the ADA, a public accommodation is “strongly encourage[d]” to consider 
a disabled person’s choice of an auxiliary aid or service for the purpose of assisting the per-
son in communicating with the public accommodation, but it is not required to give defer-
ence to the disabled person’s preference. See id. 
 161. Id. Section 504 has no equivalent requirement that obligates a doctor to ask the 
Deaf patient for his or her express choice of an appropriate accommodation for purposes of 
effective communication, or to give “primary consideration” to the patient’s express choice. 
 162. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c).  
 163. The DOJ says of doctors faced with the issue of what appropriate auxiliary aid to 
provide, “While consultation is strongly encouraged, the ultimate decision as to what 
measures to take to ensure effective communication rests in the hands of the public ac-
commodation, provided that the method chosen results in effective communication.” DOJ 
TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4.3200. However, as the cases 
show, “getting it right” is hard enough for a medical practitioner unversed in Deafness and 
Deaf culture and who does not ask the Deaf patient for advice or input on what would work 
under the circumstances. Moreover, it is probably safe to say that most practitioners who 
do not “get it right” are not sued (this would be a rich area for empirical inquiry), and the 
intents and purposes of the statute are frustrated. 
 164. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303. As the DOJ stated, 
A critical determination is what constitutes an effective auxiliary aid or service. 
The Department’s proposed rule recommended that, in determining what auxil-
iary aid to use, the public accommodation consult with an individual before pro-
viding him or her with a particular auxiliary aid or service. This suggestion 
sparked a significant volume of public comment. Many persons with disabilities, 
particularly persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, recommended that the 
rule should require that public accommodations give ‘primary consideration’ to 
the ‘expressed choice’ of an individual with a disability. These commenters as-
serted that the proposed rule was inconsistent with congressional intent of the 
ADA, with the Department’s proposed rule implementing title II of the ADA, 
and with longstanding interpretations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Id. 
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upon review of the ADA’s legislative history,165 
that Congress did not intend under title III to impose upon a pub-
lic accommodation the requirement that it give primary considera-
tion to the request of the individual with a disability [and] . . . 
finds that strongly encouraging consultation with persons with 
disabilities, in lieu of mandating primary consideration of their 
expressed choice, is consistent with congressional intent.166 
 As the preceding discussion of statutory law and regulations 
shows, the law allows the doctor to make a decision about the appro-
priate auxiliary aid without consulting with the person with a dis-
ability and without having to consider that person’s expressed choice 
for an auxiliary aid. The only requirements are that the doctor takes 
steps to implement effective communication in his or her office and 
that he or she be correct in offering an appropriate auxiliary aid un-
der the right circumstances.167 Not surprisingly, then, federal case 
                                                                                                                     
 165. According to a Senate committee report, “The Committee expects that the covered 
entity will consult with the individual with a disability before providing a particular auxil-
iary aid or service. Frequently, an individual with a disability requires a simple adjust-
ment or aid rather than an expensive or elaborate modification often envisioned by a cov-
ered entity.” S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 161 (1989). 
 166. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303. The full quotation is as follows:  
Based upon a careful review of the ADA legislative history, the Department be-
lieves that Congress did not intend under title III to impose upon a public ac-
commodation the requirement that it give primary consideration to the request 
of the individual with a disability. To the contrary, the legislative history dem-
onstrates congressional intent to strongly encourage consulting with persons 
with disabilities. In its analysis of the ADA’s auxiliary aids requirement for 
public accommodations, the House Education and Labor Committee stated that 
it ‘expects’ that ‘public accommodation(s) will consult with the individual with a 
disability before providing a particular auxiliary aid or service’ (Education and 
Labor report at 107). Some commenters also cited a different committee state-
ment that used mandatory language as evidence of legislative intent to require 
primary consideration. However, this statement was made in the context of rea-
sonable accommodations required by title I with respect to employment (Educa-
tion and Labor report at 67). Thus, the Department finds that strongly encour-
aging consultation with persons with disabilities, in lieu of mandating primary 
consideration of their expressed choice, is consistent with congressional intent. 
Id. 
 167. According to the DOJ’s Technical Assistance Manual, “While consultation is 
strongly encouraged, the ultimate decision as to what measures to take to ensure effective 
communication rests in the hands of the public accommodation, provided that the method 
chosen results in effective communication.” DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, 
supra note 9, § 4.3200 (emphasis added). By way of illustration, the Manual cites the ex-
ample of a Deaf patient who brings his own sign language interpreter for an office visit 
without prior consultation and bills the physician for the cost of the interpreter. Id. Accord-
ing to the DOJ, the physician would not be obligated to comply with the unilateral deter-
mination by the patient that an interpreter is necessary; instead, the physician must be 
given an opportunity to consult with the patient and make an independent assessment of 
what type of auxiliary aid, if any, is necessary to ensure effective communication. Id. If the 
patient believes that the physician’s decision will not lead to effective communication, then 
the patient may challenge that decision under Title III by initiating litigation or filing a 
complaint with the DOJ. See id.  
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law interpreting the statutes and the regulations reflect a breakdown 
in communication between doctor and patient.  
C.   Federal Case Law on Appropriate Auxiliary Aids 
 In Connors v. West Orange Healthcare District, Jennifer Connors, 
her husband, Robert Connors, and Dawn Borque Rochette, all three 
deaf residents of Maitland, Florida, sought emergency medical atten-
tion at defendant’s facility.168 Due to the lack of interpreters, plain-
tiffs alleged they were unable to communicate with defendant’s med-
ical personnel, who insisted on writing notes instead of calling for an 
interpreter.169 Plaintiffs claimed this deprived them of the ability to 
understand the treatment provided and the procedures performed.170 
In addition, plaintiffs said that they signed forms they did not fully 
understand and that defendant’s employees did not explain the risks 
and benefits of the treatments.171 Defendants responded that there 
was no denial of services based on disability because plaintiffs “com-
municated with the Defendant’s employees both verbally and in writ-
ing.”172 
 Citing cases where a defendant’s refusal to provide sign language 
interpreters violated the ADA,173 the court found that plaintiffs es-
tablished the elements of a successful claim under the ADA;174 plain-
tiffs alleged that in the absence of an interpreter, they could not un-
derstand what the doctors and nurses were saying to them, could not 
question the doctors about what they wrote, and had no idea how the 
doctors planned to treat their conditions.175 Because plaintiffs alleged 
an inability to communicate with defendant’s employees, the court 
found that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim under 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Connors v. W. Orange Healthcare Dist., No. 605CV647ORL31KRS, 2005 WL 
1500899, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2005). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *2. 
 171. Id. Count One of the complaint contended that defendant violated Title II of the 
ADA by 
(1) failing to maintain policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the 
ADA; (2) failing to ensure that communications with the Plaintiffs were as effec-
tive as communications with non-disabled patients; (3) failing to provide auxil-
iary aids and services; (4) failing to provide notice of the Plaintiffs’ rights; and 
(5) excluding the Plaintiffs from, and denying them the benefits of, services due 
to their disability. 
Id. at *3. Count Two focused on Section 504 and included a contention that the defendants 
“refused to accommodate the Plaintiffs with appropriate auxiliary aids and services.” Id. 
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment condemning defendant’s practices and policies, in-
junctive relief, and compensatory damages. Id. 
 172. Id. at *3.  
 173. Id. at *5 (citing Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827 (D. Md. 1998)). 
 174. Connors, 2005 WL 1500899, at *6.  
 175. Id. 
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the ADA and Section 504.176 The facts outlined in Connors establish 
that defendant’s employees refused to talk to the Deaf patients and 
their families about what was needed to establish effective communi-
cation between the parties, insisting on one approach—written 
notes—notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ protestations.  
 The arguments of the parties in Falls v. Prince George’s Hospital 
Center177 reflect a similar scenario. Plaintiffs, a hearing mother and 
her deaf daughter, a young child, sued Prince George’s Hospital Cen-
ter in Maryland, alleging that it discriminated against the daughter 
when she was admitted to and treated at defendant’s medical facility, 
because it failed to provide the daughter with an interpreter during 
her nearly week-long stay at the hospital.178 Despite repeated re-
quests from the Deaf child’s mother, the hospital refused to give the 
child an interpreter when she underwent invasive procedures:179 
Defendant misguidedly argues that here, no interpreter was nec-
essary under the regulations because the hospital did not need to 
receive medical information from Latia, or impart medical infor-
mation to her. However, the crucial question is whether an inter-
preter was necessary to afford Latia, a hearing-impaired child, an 
equal opportunity to benefit from the services provided by Defen-
dant to children who do not suffer from a hearing-impairment. 
Plaintiffs correctly state that in order to evaluate whether Latia 
was denied services or benefits available to hearing children, there 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. In order to state an ADA claim, plaintiffs must allege that they are qualified 
individuals with a disability and that they were excluded from, or denied the benefits of, 
the services, programs, and activities of a public accommodation because of their disability. 
Id. at *5. Stating a claim under the ADA also states a claim under Section 504. Id. at *6 
n.9 (citing Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000); Sutton v. Lader, 185 
F.3d 1203, 1207 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999)). Injunctive relief requires an injury-in-fact, a causal 
connection between the injury and defendant’s action, the likelihood or lack thereof of a 
real and immediate threat of future harm, and the likelihood of redressability by a favor-
able decision. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs lost standing because they said they would likely not re-
turn to defendant but might do so in the event of an emergency. Id. Because plaintiffs did 
not establish the likelihood of returning to defendant for treatment, they failed to establish 
“a real and immediate threat of future harm” and lacked standing to pursue injunctive re-
lief. Id. (citing Freydel v. N.Y. Hosp., 242 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2000); Constance v. State Univ. 
of N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. at Syracuse, 166 F. Supp. 2d 663, 667 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Proctor v. 
Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 832-33 (D. Md. 1998); Schroedel v. N.Y. Un-
iv. Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp. 594, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. 
Supp. 1329, 1334 (N.D. Cal. 1994)). For an analysis of the challenges that standing poses 
for ADA plaintiffs, see Adam Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack “Standing”: Another Pro-
cedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 69 (2004). The court’s standing decision did not end the inquiry because plaintiffs 
also asserted a claim for compensatory damages, which are available under Section 504 
and the ADA for “intentional discrimination.” Connors, 2005 WL 1500899, at *5. Because 
plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s acts, “ ‘both of omission and commission, were inten-
tional acts of discrimination,’ ” the court looked at the specific claims to see if plaintiffs 
stated a claim for relief under Section 504 and the ADA. Id.  
 177. No. Civ. A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999).  
 178. Id. at *1.  
 179. Id. at *3-4.  
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must first be a determination of what benefits and services are 
provided to such children by Defendant.180 
As the court found, 
[i]n contrast to the type of care and communication given to hear-
ing children, it appears that during Latia’s six-day hospital stay, 
no doctor or nurse communicated with her directly or through an 
interpreter to question her regarding her symptoms. Defendant 
admits that in general, when procedures are performed on hearing 
children, doctors and nurses try to calm and reassure their pa-
tients. In contrast to the testimony regarding explanations and re-
assurance given to hearing children before and during medical 
procedures, it appears that no doctor, nurse or other personnel 
provided any explanation or reassurance to Latia regarding (1) 
drawing her blood, (2) taking her urine sample, (3) giving her a 
suppository, (4) taking her x-rays, or (5) giving her a renal sono-
gram. Accordingly, a jury could conclude that Latia was not pro-
vided benefits and services equal to those provided hearing chil-
dren.181 
 Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the court granted 
the motion in part based on plaintiffs’ lack of standing to sue for in-
junctive relief under the ADA and failure to establish the elements of 
state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.182 
However, it denied the motion as to plaintiffs’ section 504 claim for 
damages.183  
 A hospital’s steadfast refusal to provide sign language interpret-
ers despite plaintiffs’ repeated requests, instead relying on “short, 
confusing and cryptic” notes, underlined the dispute in Gillespie v. 
Dimensions Health Corp.184 Although there was a VRI device, the 
hospital provided it only once and “failed and/or refused to provide 
access to the VRI device, and denied [plaintiffs’] repeated requests 
for a live sign language interpreter or an effective alternative mode 
of communication.”185 Instead, the hospital brushed aside the plain-
tiffs’ pleas for an interpreter and forced them to read lips and rely on 
written notes even though “the hospital staff limited its writing to a 
                                                                                                                     
 180. Id. at *8 (citation omitted). 
 181. Id. at *9 (citation omitted). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *8-9. 
 184. 369 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637, 639 (D. Md. 2005). 
 185. Id. at 638. VRI stands for “video remote interpreting,” where a sign language in-
terpreter at a remote location appears on a television screen that is available to both doctor 
and Deaf patient who are sitting side by side. The doctor can hear and the Deaf patient can 
see the interpreter, while the interpreter can hear and see both; the interpreter signs what 
the doctor is saying and voices what the Deaf patient is signing. See Video Remote Inter-
preting, http://www.michdhh.org/assistive_devices/video_remote_interp.html (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2008). 
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‘few words.’ ”186 The court held that given the proximity of plaintiffs’ 
residences to the hospital, the likelihood they would return in the 
event of an emergency, and evidence of past continuing violations of 
the hospital’s obligation to provide appropriate auxiliary aids, plain-
tiffs had standing to sue for injunctive relief.187 The court found it 
significant that plaintiffs were challenging a policy rather than a 
past action.188 
 Majocha v. Turner189 involved a group of ear, nose, and throat doc-
tors that adhered to a policy of refusing to provide an interpreter to a 
Deaf plaintiff caring for his infant son.190 In response to the plaintiff’s 
wife’s request for a sign language interpreter for her husband during 
the consultation, defendants sent the family a letter advising them to 
go elsewhere for their son’s treatment.191 Plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, and attorney’s fees under the ADA and Section 504, and defen-
dants moved for summary judgment.192 
 Defendants claimed “that Dr. Turner offered to communicate by 
‘note taking’ and that, because they offered one of the auxiliary aids 
listed as an ‘example’ of acceptable aids, they necessarily have ful-
filled their obligation under the ADA.”193 Defendants cited an exam-
ple from the DOJ’s commentary on auxiliary aids, which indicated 
that a bookstore would not be required to supply a sign language in-
terpreter to a customer buying a book because “effective communica-
tion can be conducted by notepad.”194  
 Plaintiffs responded that the examples of auxiliary aids and ser-
vices listed in section 36.303(b) were not exclusive and that defen-
dants could not argue “one size fits all;” that is, an offer of one ac-
commodation and nothing else could not be relied on as meeting the 
ADA obligation.195 The court sided with the plaintiffs:  
As the [DOJ] makes clear, a bookstore is not a health care pro-
vider, and the nature of the information accompanying the respec-
tive transactions are vastly different. The information ordinarily 
needed by a purchaser of a book is far less complicated than the in-
                                                                                                                     
 186. Gillespie, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 638. 
 187. Id. at 645. 
 188. Id. 
 189. 166 F. Supp. 2d 316 (W.D. Pa. 2001).   
 190. Id. at 318.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 319. 
 193. Id. at 321. 
 194. Id. (emphasis omitted). Defendants’ reference was to an excerpt from the Attorney 
General’s Report, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations 
and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35544 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 
36). 
 195. Majocha, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 321.  
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formation that must be communicated to the parents of a child 
with chronic ear infections who are considering invasive surgery to 
implant tubes in the child’s ears, in order that the parents may 
make an informed and intelligent decision.196 
 Defendants countered by arguing that plaintiffs could not insist 
on a particular auxiliary aid.197 The court said although that was 
true, plaintiffs went beyond expressing a mere preference for an in-
terpreter; they introduced evidence “to support their contention that 
the only effective means of communication possible in this case [was] 
through a qualified ASL interpreter.”198 Because there was a genuine 
dispute as to whether the defendants offered an interpreter and 
whether notetaking would be as effective as an interpreter, the court 
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment.199 The Majocha 
case is a prime illustration of the problem of a doctor refusing to lis-
ten to a deaf patient or consider the patient’s choice of auxiliary aid. 
 In Davis v. Flexman,200 a psychological counseling clinic was 
charged with failing to provide interpreters to a Deaf couple in mari-
tal strife.201 A central issue was whether the director of the clinic, 
Jerry Flexman, “acted with deliberate indifference to the Davises’ re-
quests for an interpreter.”202 The record reflected multiple requests 
on the part of the Deaf couple for sign language interpreter services 
during counseling sessions and Flexman’s repeated refusals to pro-
vide interpreters.203 Indeed, the evidence showed that despite being 
told about the ADA and given a copy of the statute—which he did not 
read—Flexman continued to drag his feet on the provision regarding 
a sign language interpreter.204 Because the evidence demonstrated a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to Flexman’s deliberate 
                                                                                                                     
 196. Id. at 322. 
 197. Id. at 323.  
 198. Id. The evidence consisted of expert testimony by a teacher of the Deaf that fo-
cused on plaintiff’s family history, including his life long use of ASL as his primary lan-
guage and his high level of proficiency in ASL. See id. The court quoted from the expert’s 
report: 
The use of ASL is strongly advised in order to ensure effective communication 
with Mr. Majocha.  Given a situation in which an individual who is not profi-
cient in ASL has a need to communicate with Mr. Majocha, the services of a 
qualified sign language interpreter would be necessary to ensure effective com-
munication. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). The court credited the expert’s testimony. Id. 
 199. Id. at 323-24. 
 200. 109 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D. Ohio 1999).  
 201. Id. at 780. 
 202. Id. at 791. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 780-82, 791-92. Continuing to insist the law imposed no obligation on him, 
Flexman promised to provide a computer to help the Davises communicate with their the-
rapist, but he never did so. Id. at 781, 791. 
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indifference to the Davises’ communication needs, the court denied 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue.205 
 The dispute in Bravin v. Mount Sinai Medical Center206 centered 
squarely on a hospital’s refusal to grant an interpreter to another 
plaintiff.207 Attending Lamaze birthing classes at Mount Sinai Medi-
cal Center, Jeff Bravin and his wife, Naomi, a Deaf couple, asked for 
a sign language interpreter, contending that without an interpreter, 
the husband would be denied an equal opportunity to benefit from 
the classes.208 The hospital rejected the husband’s requests on the 
ground he was not “the patient.”209 Arguing that its offer of a TTY to 
the husband was sufficient to meet its obligation under the law, the 
hospital claimed that plaintiff could not “premise [his] claim[] of in-
tentional discrimination upon [his] preference for an ASL interpreter 
over a TTY.”210   
 In terms of damages, the court weighed plaintiff’s argument that 
a TTY was not an effective substitute for an interpreter against de-
fendant’s argument that an interpreter was not always required and 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 795. What is interesting about Davis v. Flexman is the court’s tortured in-
terpretation of Ohio’s antidiscrimination regulation, OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4112-5, promul-
gated by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which defines unlawful discrimination as the 
denial by a place of public accommodation, on the basis of disability, “any term, condition, 
privilege, service or advantage which, upon entrance to such facility, accrues to the public 
in general.” See Davis, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 796. Plaintiffs contended that Flexman’s failure 
to provide interpreters violated this section of Ohio’s administrative regulations, but the 
court rejected the claim: 
On its face, this regulation states only that a place of public accommodation 
may not, because of an individual’s handicap, deny that person any term, con-
dition, privilege, service, or advantage that is available to the public in gen-
eral. In the present case, the Defendants did not deny Julia Davis their counsel-
ing services. Rather, she found the services unsatisfactory in the absence of an 
interpreter. 
Id. (second emphasis added). The court failed to understand that the absence of an inter-
preter resulted in the denial of counseling services. Indeed, the court disregarded or forgot 
Joanne Voelkel’s deposition in which she stated that when plaintiffs brought their own in-
terpreter, at their expense, the presence of the interpreter “had been beneficial.” Id. at 781. 
This conclusion represents a stunning ignorance of plaintiffs’ communication needs and an 
inability to understand that opening the door to the clinic without an interpreter served as 
a barrier as real as a wall or curb for wheelchair users. Substitute “wheelchair user” for 
the Deaf plaintiff, and the flaw in the court’s logic becomes readily apparent: the clinic’s 
failure to ramp its entrance door did not deny plaintiff her counseling services. Rather, she 
found the services unsatisfactory in the absence of a ramp. The services were unsatisfac-
tory because the plaintiff could not get in. 
 206. 186 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated in part, 58 F. Supp. 2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 207. Bravin, 186 F.R.D. at 296. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 302. The term, “TTY,” refers to “a special device that lets people who are 
deaf, hard of hearing, or speech-impaired use the telephone to communicate, by allowing 
them to type messages back and forth to one another instead of talking and listening. A 
TTY is required at both ends of the conversation in order to communicate.” AboutTTY.com, 
http://www.abouttty.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
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found that defendant’s motion to dismiss the damages claims was in-
appropriate.211 With respect to plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the issue of defendant’s liability for failing to provide an in-
terpreter, the court reasoned that since the wife needed her husband 
as her “birthing partner” at the Lamaze class, the husband needed a 
reasonable accommodation and had successfully met his burden of 
production in establishing a prima facie case showing that such an 
accommodation was available.212 The court’s analysis of this issue fo-
cused exclusively on whether a qualified interpreter was a “reason-
able accommodation,” and because the defendant hospital failed to 
meet its burden of persuasion with respect to whether providing an 
interpreter would be an “undue hardship,” the court granted plaintiff 
summary judgment with respect to defendant’s liability for failing to 
accommodate the husband.213 Mt. Sinai did not consult with Jeff Bra-
vin or consider his request, and the hospital’s failure to do either in-
creased the likelihood it would end up violating the ADA. 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Bravin, 186 F.R.D. at 302. 
 212. Id. at 304-05. The court termed the issue as one of “reasonable accommodation.” 
Id. That is a term of art reserved for Title I, where 
[t]he term, “reasonable accommodation” may include – (A) making existing fa-
cilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, re-
assignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or de-
vices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training mate-
rials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (West 2008). Under Title I, it is discrimination to 
(A) not mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental li-
mitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an appli-
cant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of 
such covered entity; or (B) deny[] employment opportunities to a job applicant or 
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such de-
nial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommoda-
tion to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A),(B) (West 2008). Under Title III, however, discrimination is 
the 
failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with 
a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differ-
ently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and ser-
vices, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or 
accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). “Reasonable accommodation” language 
does not appear in Title III. 
 213. Bravin, 186 F.R.D. at 306. On defendant’s motion to reconsider the grant of sum-
mary judgment to plaintiff, the court reaffirmed its decision, stating, “Given that Mt. Sinai 
did not provide Bravin with any accommodation, it seems obvious that ‘effective communi-
cation’ could not have been achieved.” Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 58 F. Supp. 2d 269, 
273 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
988  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:947 
 
 Initially, the doctor in Mayberry v. Von Valtier214 wrote to plain-
tiff’s daughter informing her that the doctor wanted plaintiff to have 
an interpreter when she came in for a consultation, and in fact the 
doctor did provide her with an interpreter.215 However, after this visit 
the doctor wrote a letter to the interpreter implying that she would 
be unable to utilize her services or provide care to the patient in the 
future because of the cost associated with providing interpreter ser-
vices.216  
 Plaintiff’s proof of discrimination consisted of “defendant’s own 
words in the February 22, 1993 letter to Ms. Ferrero [and] the affi-
davit of [plaintiff’s daughter] which states that defendant wanted 
plaintiff to bring an interpreter to future appointments.”217 Plaintiff 
also pointed to a note written by defendant on plaintiff’s chart, indi-
cating defendant’s confusion over the exact location of plaintiff’s 
pain, which plaintiff claimed was due to poor communication.218 Fi-
nally, plaintiff submitted a note written by defendant, instructing 
plaintiff to consult an ophthalmologist and suggesting that she “take 
someone with her who signs so you can explain problem & answer 
their questions completely.”219 
 In response to defendant doctor’s motion for summary judgment, 
the court held that plaintiff established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination under the ADA and section 504 by setting forth enough 
evidence that she was being denied treatment based on her disabil-
ity.220 Because defendant failed to satisfy her burden of proof on the 
issue of whether she refused to hire an interpreter for plaintiff, the 
court denied her motion for summary judgment.221 Once again, a 
stubborn doctor ran afoul of the law because she did not listen. 
 The above cases have a recurring theme: an aurally inaccessible 
office frustrates a Deaf patient who asks for a sign language inter-
preter and gets a negative response from the doctor. The doctor re-
flexively claims that writing notes or reading lips are sufficient auxil-
iary aids but remains unmindful of the Justice Department’s admo-
nition that most medical encounters envision a sign language inter-
preter.222 More importantly, the doctor is unmindful of the fact the 
deaf patient is a valuable source of information on appropriate auxil-
iary aids; all the doctor has to do is to ask a simple question: “What 
works for you?” That question is rarely asked, because the law does 
                                                                                                                     
 214. 843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Mich. 1994).  
 215. Id. at 1162. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. at 1166. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1167. 
 221. Id.  
 222. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.303. 
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not require it. Perhaps if the doctor was required to ask the question 
and had to accord due weight to the patient’s response, we would see 
a different outcome: an exchange of creative and innovative ideas on 
how to make communication in the medical setting easier and more 
efficient. 
 What might those creative and innovative ideas for building an 
aurally accessible office be? It depends on the patient and on the con-
text of the encounter with the doctor. Of course, many patients will 
need an interpreter, and if they say they need one, that choice ought 
to be accorded respect and deference. But doctors and lawyers make 
a mistake if they assume that every Deaf patient wants an inter-
preter. For example, CART and VRI can ensure that a variety of deaf 
patients are served appropriately according to their needs and the 
circumstances.223 Sometimes pen and paper or lip-reading will suf-
fice. Doctors need to ask the question and listen to the reply, and the 
law needs to enforce that by way of properly drafted commentary and 
analyses that require a consultation with the Deaf patient (or any 
other person with a disability) and “primary consideration” of the 
person’s choice of an auxiliary aid.  
IV.   THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S STANCE 
 Ironically, the Justice Department fully understands the need for 
a doctor to consult with a Deaf patient and give the patient’s express 
choice “primary consideration.” As this Part shows, the Department’s 
own consent decrees and settlement agreements with medical pro-
viders adopt language calling for compulsory consultation between 
doctors and deaf patients, with an implicit understanding that the 
doctors will give “primary consideration” to the Deaf patients’ choices 
of auxiliary aids. 
                                                                                                                     
 223. CART is an acronym for “computer-aided real-time transcription” or “communica-
tion access real-time translation,” where the spoken word is instantly translated into Eng-
lish text using a stenotype machine, notebook computer, and real-time software. See Com-
munication Access Information Center, What Exactly Is CART?, http://www.cartinfo.org 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008). The text appears on a computer monitor or other display. Id. 
As discussed supra note 185, VRI is an acronym for “video remote interpreting,” where 
both the ASL user and the hearing person are located in the same room and the video relay 
interpreter is in a remote location. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. 
Supp. 2d 636, 638 n.2 (D. Md. 2005); AT&T, Video Relay FAQs, 
http://www.consumer.att.com/relay/video/faqs.html#8 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). VRI, 
however, ought to serve as a temporary measure until an interpreter arrives on the scene. 
VRI cannot and should not ever serve as a permanent substitute for a live in-person inter-
preter.  
990  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:947 
 
A.   Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements 
 In Devinney v. Maine Medical Center,224 the Justice Department 
helped establish a consent decree against the Maine Medical Center, 
which contained language calling for consultation with Deaf pa-
tients.225 In this case, plaintiffs Janet Devinney and the United 
States sued the medical center, alleging it failed to provide auxiliary 
aids and services, including qualified sign language interpreters, 
where such aids and services were necessary for effective communi-
cation between Deaf patients and defendant’s medical staff, as re-
quired by the ADA, section 504, governing regulations, and state 
law.226 The outcome of the lawsuit was the entry of a consent decree. 
As the court recognized, “Sign language interpreters and other auxil-
iary aids and services are necessary to provide equal access to hospi-
tal services for deaf and hard of hearing individuals.”227 
 The consent decree calls for defendant Maine Medical Center to 
consult with the Deaf patient as to his or her choice of accommoda-
tion and to recognize the importance of registering his or her prefer-
ence: “[Defendant’s] personnel shall consult with the person who is 
deaf to ensure the deaf person’s preferred method(s) of communica-
tion as well as the equipment necessary to ensure effective communi-
cation are expressed on the Notice.”228 Once defendant is aware that 
a Deaf patient is coming in, it must hand the patient a copy of “Ser-
                                                                                                                     
 224. No. Civ. 97-276-P-C, 1998 WL 271495 (D. Me. May 18, 1998) (consent decree).   
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. at *1.  
 227. Id. The term, “qualified interpreter,” rooted in the legal definition outlined in the 
regulation, is fleshed out in the decree: “[A]n interpreter who is able to interpret compe-
tently, accurately, and impartially both receptively and expressively, using any specialized 
terminology necessary for effective communication in a medical setting.” Id. at *4; see also 
36 C.F.R. § 36.104. Specifically, that definition excludes people who have only a rudimen-
tary familiarity of sign language or finger spelling, or who are fluent in sign language but 
do not possess the ability to translate spoken communication into the proper signs or to ob-
serve someone else signing and change their signed or finger spelled communication into 
spoken words. Devinney, 1998 WL 271495, at *4. 
 228. Devinney, 1998 WL 271495, at *4. Effective communication is defined as follows: 
[Defendant] shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services, including 
sign language interpreters, where such aids and services are necessary to en-
sure effective communication with persons who are deaf and shall provide per-
sons who are deaf with the full and equal enjoyment of the services, privileges, 
facilities, advantages and accommodations of MMC as required by this Decree, 
the ADA and Section 504. 
Id. Auxiliary aids and services include 
qualified interpreters, telecommunication devices for the deaf (TDDs), assistive 
listening devices (ALDs), captioned televisions, trained note-takers, computer 
assisted real time transcription (CART), telephone “flashers” to indicate incom-
ing calls (where appropriate, such as in patient rooms) and other similar aids 
and services as defined by 36 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(1). Appropriate auxiliary aids 
do not include new or experimental technology that is not generally available 
and is not widely used in the United States. 
Id. at *3. 
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vices for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Persons at Maine Medical Cen-
ter” and assist the patient, if necessary, in filling it out.229 
 In addition, the decree commands defendant to never request “a 
family member, companion, case manager, advocate or friend” of the 
deaf patient to serve as interpreter, and in the event the patient 
wants a relative or friend to interpret, defendant must secure a 
signed refusal (or notation of a refusal of both the hospital-supplied 
interpreter and the signed refusal form), ascertain that the relative 
or friend is willing to facilitate communication, and explore with the 
patient “other more effective means of communication (including re-
peating the offer of a qualified interpreter)” when it appears that 
there is a lack of effective communication between the patient and 
the hospital personnel.230  
  The decree also requires defendant to post signs letting deaf pa-
tients know they can ask for assistance with communication:  
[Defendant shall post signs] of conspicuous size and print at all 
hospital admitting stations and at the general public entrance 
stating, “Maine Medical Center provides sign language interpret-
ing services, telecommunication devices (TTYs), and other aids and 
services to persons who are deaf or hard of hearing. These services 
are provided by [Maine Medical Center] free of charge. Please ask 
for assistance.”, or such other comparable language as meets the 
approval of the Office of the United States Attorney. These signs 
will include the international signs for “interpreter,” “TDD,” “deaf” 
                                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at *4. 
 230. Id. at *6-7. Contrast this with this Author’s experience at a New York-based hos-
pital where the hospital insisted he had to work with an interpreter on its staff. At no time 
did the staff offer him a choice or an opportunity to sign a refusal form. He did not com-
plain because the interpreter was superb, and he had the full and equal enjoyment of the 
hospital’s medical services. The Devinney decree outlines very specific contexts that re-
quire an interpreter: 
[Maine Medical Center] shall provide a qualified sign language interpreter 
and/or other appropriate auxiliary aids and services in all circumstances where 
necessary for effective communication as required by the ADA and Section 504, 
including, but not limited to the following circumstances: (i) determination of a 
patient’s medical history or description of ailment or injury; (ii) provision of pa-
tient rights, informed consent or permission for treatment; (iii) explanation of 
living wills or powers of attorney (or their availability); (iv) diagnosis or prog-
nosis of an ailment or injury; (v) explanation of procedures, tests, treatment, 
treatment options or surgery; (vi) explanation of medications prescribed includ-
ing dosage as well as how and when the medication is to be taken and any pos-
sible side effects; (vii) explanation regarding follow-up treatment, therapy, test 
results or recovery; (viii) discharge instructions; (ix) provision of psychiatric 
evaluation, group and individual therapy, counseling and other therapeutic ac-
tivities, including grief counseling and crisis intervention; (x) explanation of 
any billing or insurance issues that may arise; (xi) classes concerning birthing, 
nutrition, CPR, weight management, etc.; (xii) informational presentations for 
patients or the public; (xiii) regularly scheduled religious services provided at 
[Maine Medical Center]; and (xiv) blood donation or apheresis. 
Id. at *5. 
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and “assistive listening device.” [Maine Medical Center] will also 
offer to post on the door of the room of each deaf patient a sign of 
appropriately conspicuous size and print that states: “Deaf Pa-
tient.”231 
 In the case of an emergency where the patient has not refused an 
interpreter but doctors could not wait for the interpreter to start 
treatment, defendant must, once a call for an interpreter has gone 
out, use “flash cards, pictograph forms, written notes, charts, dia-
grams and its best efforts to provide the most effective communica-
tion possible until such time as the qualified interpreter arrives at 
[Maine Medical Center].”232 
 The decree calls for the provision and use of CART, an array of 
telecommunication services (including TDDs and closed-captioned 
televisions), fire alarms, assistive listening devices, and “pictograph 
forms and flash cards.”233 Deaf people who enter defendant’s medical 
center not as patients but as relatives or friends authorized to com-
municate with medical personnel about the patient are to be covered 
by the decree.234 If the medical center offers any educational or sup-
port activities, it shall offer deaf participants the appropriate auxil-
iary aids and services, including sign language interpreters, “as are 
necessary to ensure effective communication whenever [Maine Medi-
cal Center] has adequate notice of such a need in advance of the ac-
tivity.”235  
 The Devinney decree clearly evinces the Justice Department’s un-
derstanding that notwithstanding the hortatory nature of the regula-
tion on consulting with Deaf patients, it was important and benefi-
cial to require the doctor to have a conversation with the Deaf pa-
tient about appropriate auxiliary aids. The decree also recognizes the 
importance of providing the Deaf patient with a panoply of auxiliary 
aids. Most importantly, the Deaf patient is rightly seen as a valuable 
resource in figuring out an appropriate solution. 
 Similarly, in a settlement agreement with Modern Dental Profes-
sional, Indiana, P.C., the Justice Department required Modern Den-
                                                                                                                     
 231. Id. That would have raised the hackles of a few of the respondents in this Author’s 
dissertation study who chafed at being labeled “deaf” because they felt it invaded their pri-
vacy. See Schwartz Dissertation, supra note 11. 
 232. Devinney, 1998 WL 271495, at *7. 
 233. Id. at *7-10. The pictograph forms and flash cards “shall be used merely as a 
means to facilitate, rather than as a substitute for, other more effective means of interac-
tion with hospital personnel.” Id. at *10.  
 234. Id. at *10. 
 235. Id. at *11. The decree is silent as to when the defendant is obligated to give Deaf 
patients and their relatives or friends notice of educational or support activities. If an ac-
tivity is scheduled at the spur of the moment, the Deaf participant may not have time to 
give adequate notice and defendant medical center may not have sufficient time to secure 
an interpreter. 
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tal to adopt a policy requiring consultation with the Deaf patient.236 
Deaf and hard-of-hearing patients “are to be informed that Modern 
Dental Professionals, Indiana, P.C. d/b/a Monarch Dental Associates 
will arrange for appropriate auxiliary aids and services needed for ef-
fective communication at all dental appointments or when requested 
by the patient.”237 In order to determine what constitutes an appro-
priate auxiliary aid under the circumstances (“timing, duration, and 
frequency”), Modern Dental personnel “who are otherwise primarily 
responsible for coordinating and/or providing patient care services 
[will consult] with the patient or companion where possible.”238 When 
the office consults with the Deaf patient, it must consider “(a) the na-
ture, length and importance of the communication at issue; (b) the 
individual’s communication skills and knowledge; (c) the patient’s re-
quest for or statement of need for an interpreter; (d) the availability at 
the required times, of appropriate auxiliary aids and services, includ-
ing qualified sign language interpreters.”239 In addition, the timing of 
such an assessment is important:  
The determination of which appropriate auxiliary aids and ser-
vices are necessary, must be made at the time an appointment is 
scheduled. Modern Personnel will perform and document in the 
patient’s dental chart a communication assessment as part of each 
initial inpatient assessment. The Modern Personnel shall reassess 
which appropriate auxiliary aids and services are necessary, in 
consultation with the patient or companion where possible, in the 
event that communication is not effective.240 
 Significantly, Modern Dental was required to generate and fur-
nish each Deaf patient who entered the offices of the dental practice 
with a “Model Communication Assessment Form” that would enable 
Modern Dental’s employees “to make an assessment as to whether a 
patient who is deaf or hard of hearing requires appropriate auxiliary 
aids and services, such as interpreters, for effective communica-
tion.”241 In the form, the Deaf patient is asked, “Does the patient with 
a disability need/require a professional qualified sign language or 
oral interpreter (which will be provided free of charge) to communi-
cate effectively with Modern personnel?”242  
                                                                                                                     
 236. Settlement Agreement between the United States of America and Modern Dental 
Professional, Indiana, P.C., DJ No. 202-26s-114, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ 
moddentpro.htm.   
 237. Id., App. A (“Monarch Dental Associates Effective Communication Policy”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (emphasis added). 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. App. B (“Modern Dental Professionals d/b/a/ Monarch Dental Associates Model 
Communication Assessment Form”). 
 242. Id. The form offers a checklist of possible scenarios: the patient does not sign and 
does not need an interpreter; the patient prefers a family member or friend to assist with 
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 Finally, Modern Dental Associates was required to post a sign 
stating that it would provide qualified sign language interpreters or 
other auxiliary aids or services, free of charge, and list a telephone 
number where the patient could call for communication assistance.243 
This settlement agreement drives home the Justice Department’s be-
lief that in order for the parties to have effective communication, 
they must be required to talk about appropriate auxiliary aids and 
give weight to the patient’s choice.244 It is rather odd that the Justice 
Department requires in its decrees and consent settlements what it 
will not require in its interpretation of 28 C.F.R. section 36.303. 
B.   Comparing Title II with Title III 
 When it comes to state and local government services, the Justice 
Department takes the opposite tack. Like the private sector, the pub-
lic sector must ensure that its communications with individuals with 
disabilities are as effective as communications with others and, in 
order to do so, the government must provide “appropriate auxiliary 
aids and services when necessary to ensure effective communica-
tion.”245 As the Department explains in the Appendix to its Commen-
                                                                                                                     
communication; the patient prefers to write notes; the patient prefers an interpreter and is 
asked for a preference (ASL, Signed English or oral). Id. There is a line, “Other,” to allow 
for an alternative auxiliary aid or service. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. This was not the only settlement agreement evidencing the DOJ’s emphasis on 
compulsory communication between doctor and patient. Provisions strikingly similar to the 
Modern Dental agreement are found in the settlement agreement between the United 
States and South Florida Baptist Hospital, DJ No. 202-17M-195, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/southflor.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). In the South Flor-
ida Baptist agreement, the hospital must consult with Deaf patients and, in the event a 
patient does not make a request but hospital personnel believe an auxiliary aid would be 
helpful, the hospital must inform the patient that such aids and services are available. Id. 
§ 34. In a lawsuit against an LSAT test preparer in the District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, the DOJ secured a consent decree requiring defendant to “establish 
written procedures for students requesting accommodations” and post the material on de-
fendant’s Web site, which would allow students to file an electronic request for accommo-
dations. United States of America v. Robin Singh Educational Services, Inc., d/b/a/ Test-
masters, CV06-3466 § 3.4 available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/testmaster.htm#Anchor-The-
49575 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). Upon receipt of the request, defendant is required to 
evaluate the request and contact the student with a decision; if it is not what the student 
requested, defendant must provide a written explanation. Id. § 3.5. Finally, in a settlement 
agreement involving a medical center, the defendant medical center agreed to consult with 
Deaf patients regarding their communication needs. Settlement Agreement between the 
United States of America and the Central Mississippi Medical Center, DJ No. 202-41-20, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/ctlmissm.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).  
 245. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government 
Services, Subpart E, Communications, 28 C.F.R. § 35 (1992), available at 
http://www.ada.gov/reg2.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 42 U.S.C.A. Section 12134 states 
the general rule that public entities such as state and local governments cannot discrimi-
nate against people with disabilities. Thus, according to 28 C.F.R. Section 35.160(a), “A 
public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, 
participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communica-
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tary, section 35.160 requires the public entity to take such steps as 
may be necessary to ensure that communications with applicants, 
participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effec-
tive as communications with others.246 To perform this duty, the pub-
lic entity must “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services when 
necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportu-
nity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, the public entity’s 
service, program, or activity.”247 
 But unlike places of public accommodations under Title III, state 
and local government services under Title II must give the person 
with a disability an opportunity to make an express choice, and the 
“public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the 
individual with disabilities.”248 According to the Justice Department, 
individuals with disabilities must be given “an opportunity . . . to re-
quest the auxiliary aids and services of their choice.”249 The public 
entity must honor the choice unless it can demonstrate that another 
effective means of communication exists or that use of the means 
chosen would not be required under section 35.164.250 
 The Justice Department justifies placing this obligation on the 
public entity: 
Deference to the request of the individual with a disability is de-
sirable because of the range of disabilities, the variety of auxiliary 
aids and services, and different circumstances requiring effective 
communication. For instance, some courtrooms are now equipped 
for “computer-assisted transcripts,” which allow virtually instan-
taneous transcripts of courtroom argument and testimony to ap-
pear on displays. Such a system might be an effective auxiliary aid 
or service for a person who is deaf or has a hearing loss who uses 
                                                                                                                     
tions with others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a). Section 35.160(b)(1) states, “A public entity shall 
furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual 
with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, 
program, or activity conducted by a public entity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1); see also DOJ 
TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 7.1000. Much of the DOJ’s Title 
II regulations are based on the its Section 504 regulations. 
 246. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A § 35.160. 
 247. Id. 
 248. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2). 
 249. Id. According to the DOJ TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON TITLE II, 
When an auxiliary aid or service is required, the public entity must provide an 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities to request the auxiliary aids and 
services of their choice and must give primary consideration to the choice ex-
pressed by the individual. “Primary consideration” means that the public entity 
must honor the choice, unless it can demonstrate that another equally effective 
means of communication is available, or that use of the means chosen would re-
sult in a fundamental alteration in the service, program, or activity or in undue 
financial and administrative burdens. 
DOJ TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 7.1100. 
 250. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A (1992).  
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speech to communicate, but may be useless for someone who uses 
sign language.251 
The Department explains further: 
It is important to consult with the individual to determine the 
most appropriate auxiliary aid or service, because the individual 
with a disability is most familiar with his or her disability and is 
in the best position to determine what type of aid or service will be 
effective. Some individuals who were deaf at birth or who lost their 
hearing before acquiring language, for example, use sign language 
as their primary form of communication and may be uncomfortable 
or not proficient with written English, making use of a notepad an 
ineffective means of communication.252 
 The statutory language of Title II is similar to that of Title III; 
both public entities and private businesses must ensure their pro-
grams, activities, and services are accessible to people with disabili-
ties.253 There is nothing in the statutes calling for compulsory conver-
sation with a person with a disability, let alone for giving “primary 
consideration” to the person’s choice of auxiliary aid, and yet the Jus-
tice Department’s regulations interpreting a public entity’s obliga-
tions under Title II construes the statute to require such a conversa-
tion. If it is desirable for a public entity to defer to the wishes of a 
                                                                                                                     
 251. Id. The Appendix goes on to stress flexibility in deciding on an appropriate ac-
commodation: 
Although in some circumstances a notepad and written materials may be suffi-
cient to permit effective communication, in other circumstances they may not be 
sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may be necessary when the in-
formation being communicated is complex, or is exchanged for a lengthy period 
of time. Generally, factors to be considered in determining whether an inter-
preter is required include the context in which the communication is taking 
place, the number of people involved, and the importance of the communication. 
Id. 
 252. DOJ TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 7.1100. The Man-
ual goes on to say, 
Individuals who lose their hearing later in life, on the other hand, may not be 
familiar with sign language and can communicate effectively through writing. 
For these individuals, use of a word processor with a videotext display may pro-
vide effective communication in transactions that are long or complex, and com-
puter-assisted simultaneous transcription may be necessary in courtroom pro-
ceedings. Individuals with less severe hearing impairments are often able to 
communicate most effectively with voice amplification provided by an assistive 
listening device. 
Id. 
 253. Pursuant to Title II of the ADA, “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Pursuant 
to Title III of the ADA, “A public accommodation shall take those steps that may be neces-
sary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, 
or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary 
aids and services.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). 
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person with a disability “because of the range of disabilities, the va-
riety of auxiliary aids and services, and different circumstances re-
quiring effective communication,”254 why is that a less compelling ra-
tionale in the private sector? If it is important for a public entity to 
consult with a disabled person “because the individual with a disabil-
ity is most familiar with his or her disability and is in the best posi-
tion to determine what type of aid or service will be effective,”255 why 
is that not the case in the private sector? Nowhere does the Justice 
Department explain why public entities must consult with disabled 
people and give “primary consideration” to the person’s express 
choice, but private businesses do not have to. Nowhere does the De-
partment explain the difference between a local government doctor 
and a private hospital doctor. It can’t, because there isn’t one.  
C.   The Legislative History Defense 
 The Justice Department argues that legislative history evinces a 
congressional intent merely to “strongly encourage” doctors and other 
public accommodations to consult with patients with disabilities.256 
This reliance on legislative history is misplaced. First, the qualitative 
research data compiled from 2002 to 2004 shows the complexity and 
variety of Deaf patients, evidence that was not available to congres-
sional legislators considering the new bill in the late 1980s and early 
1990. The extent to which private doctors have resisted Deaf pa-
tients’ requests for auxiliary aids under the ADA was unknown in 
1990 when the law was passed. Now that we have actual experience 
with how doctors are responding to the requests of Deaf patients for 
appropriate auxiliary aids, including sign language interpreters, we 
need to rethink the Justice Department’s original reliance on the 
statements of a few legislators. 
 Second, the Justice Department’s own consent decrees and set-
tlement agreements belie its reliance on legislative history: if the 
Department was convinced that merely “strongly encouraging” doc-
tors to consult with Deaf patients was sufficient, why would it struc-
ture its decrees and agreements to require consultation?  
 Third, the statement of one or two legislators ought not trump the 
needs of Deaf patients, particularly where it is clear that the medical 
setting is a complex and nuanced one for Deaf patients and where 
these patients are a good resource for figuring out the appropriate 
auxiliary aids for effective communication.257  
                                                                                                                     
 254. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A § 35.160. 
 255. DOJ TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 7.1100. 
 256. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B § 36.303. 
 257. In his concurring opinion in Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993), Justice Scalia 
wrote, “The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by 
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D.   What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander 
 There is also an element of unfairness in the allocation of oppor-
tunity to consult. Recall the Department of Justice Technical Assis-
tance Manual: “While consultation is strongly encouraged, the ulti-
mate decision as to what measures to take to ensure effective commu-
nication rests in the hands of the public accommodation, provided 
that the method chosen results in effective communication.”258 By way 
of illustration, the Manual cites the example of a Deaf patient who 
brings his own sign language interpreter for an office visit without 
prior consultation and bills the physician for the cost of the inter-
preter.259 According to the Department, the physician would not be 
obligated to comply with the unilateral determination by the patient 
that an interpreter is necessary; instead, the physician must be given 
an opportunity to consult with the patient and make an independent 
assessment of what type of auxiliary aid, if any, is necessary to en-
sure effective communication.260 The Department says that if the pa-
tient believes that the physician’s decision will not lead to effective 
communication, then the patient may challenge that decision under 
Title III by initiating litigation or filing a complaint with the De-
partment of Justice.261 But just as the doctor must be given an oppor-
tunity to consult with the patient, so should the patient be given an 
opportunity to consult with the doctor. Just as society sees it fit to 
                                                                                                                     
laws, not by the intentions of legislators.” Id. at 519. The Supreme Court held unanimously 
in Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), that a criminal defendant may not pro-
spectively waive the application of the Speedy Trial Act, rendering his agreement to waive 
the Act’s protections “for all time” in a pending prosecution null and void. Id. at 494. Citing 
the Act’s legislative history, Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that the language and 
purposes of the Speedy Trial Act did not permit prospective waivers. Id. In response, Jus-
tice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion criticizing the majority’s use of legislative history: 
It may seem that there is no harm in using committee reports and other such 
sources when they are merely in accord with the plain meaning of the Act. But 
this sort of intellectual piling-on has addictive consequences. To begin with, it 
accustoms us to believing that what is said by a single person in a floor debate 
or by a committee report represents the view of Congress as a whole—so that 
we sometimes even will say (when referring to a floor statement and committee 
report) that “Congress has expressed” thus-and-so. . . . There is no basis either 
in law or in reality for this naive belief. Moreover, if legislative history is rele-
vant when it confirms the plain meaning of the statutory text, it should also be 
relevant when it contradicts the plain meaning, thus rendering what is plain 
ambiguous. Because the use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised 
in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its 
face—I do not join this portion of the Court’s opinion. 
Id. at 510-11 (Scalia, J., concurring). For an interesting analysis of Justice Scalia’s 
treatment of legislative history, see JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (2007). 
 258. DOJ TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4.3200 (emphasis 
added). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
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give the doctor that opportunity, there is nothing in law or logic that 
says we cannot do that for the Deaf patient. After all, the ADA is for 
the benefit of both the Deaf patient and the doctor.262  
E.   Whither the American Medical Association? 
 Ironically, it is the American Medical Association (AMA) that un-
dercuts the Justice Department’s refusal to require doctors to consult 
with Deaf patients. The AMA’s Web site deals with the applicability 
of the ADA to the medical profession and discusses the auxiliary aid 
requirement as follows: 
The first step is to determine, in consultation with the patient, the 
appropriate auxiliary aid or service. In some instances, such as 
when a conversation is particularly important relative to the care 
and services being provided, or is particularly complex, effective 
communication may only be ensured through the use of a qualified 
interpreter.263 
This offers an example of language stronger than the “strongly en-
couraging” terminology used by the Justice Department. Indeed, the 
AMA is on record as advising America’s doctors to consult with the 
patient. Moreover, the AMA takes a position contrary to the Justice 
Department on the issue of giving “primary consideration” to the pa-
tient’s choice: “Although the health care professional makes the final 
decision regarding use of an interpreter or other alternative, the pa-
tient’s choice should be given primary consideration.”264 
 With the AMA in my corner, I rest my case. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Generally, the courts may properly rely on the well-reasoned 
views of the agency implementing a statute, because the agency has 
a body of experience and informed judgment.265 Thus, judges should 
give controlling weight to the Justice Department’s regulations un-
less they are plainly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or clearly con-
                                                                                                                     
 262. While the protections of the ADA extend only to people with disabilities, public ac-
commodations, including physicians and hospitals, benefit from bringing people with dis-
abilities into the mainstream of American life. Doctors and hospitals generate income by 
treating members of this community, which is a substantial segment of the population, and 
society benefits by having a healthier population. In addition, by providing accessible 
communication to Deaf patients, doctors and hospitals reduce their liability for malpractice 
by reducing the risk of misdiagnosis or miscommunication. 
 263. See American Medical Association, Americans with Disabilities Act and Hearing 
Interpreters, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4616.html (emphasis added) (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2008).  
 264. Id. 
 265. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998). 
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trary to the statute.266 In determining whether to give such weight to 
the Department’s interpretation of Title III, a court must first de-
termine if the statute has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue and, if it has not, the court must decide if the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.267 The Justice 
Department’s construction of the law is not the only permissible 
reading of the statute,268 but its interpretation will be sustained so 
long as it is reasonable in light of the text and purpose of the statute 
and consistent with the statute and regulation.269  
 There is no justifiable reason for the Justice Department to dis-
tinguish between public doctors and private doctors. Doctors are not 
savvy enough to establish an aurally accessible environment without 
the help of their Deaf patients. Case law reflects the difficulty many 
doctors have in understanding the need for sign language interpret-
ers as a vehicle for effective communication. Thus, the courts should 
reject the Department’s interpretation of the effective communication 
regulation that does not require consultation or “primary considera-
tion.” 
 Moreover, the courts should disregard the Justice Department’s 
cramped interpretation because the full participation of Deaf pa-
tients in the medical setting, where doctors are required to listen, en-
sures that the patient’s health care needs are being addressed in a 
complete and adequate way. Cost will almost never be a reason to 
deny a Deaf patient the communication arrangement he or she needs 
to effectively access the medical setting.270 Furthermore, Deaf pa-
tients will no longer accept the argument that their requests are a 
burden to the medical provider’s budget. Thus, a consultation re-
quirement has two benefits: a healthier population and diminished 
liability for medical personnel, who, by having appropriate accommo-
dations, minimize the risk and danger of malpractice.271  
                                                                                                                     
 266. U.S. v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Gambrinus 
Co., 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997); Speciner v. NationsBank, 215 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Md. 
2002); Majocha v. Turner, 166 F. Supp. 2d 316 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 267. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1060. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng’rs, P.C., 950 F. 
Supp. 389 (D. D.C. 1996). 
 270. Most courts addressing the issue of cost “have noted that a reasonable accommo-
dation is both moderate and not unduly burdensome.” Bravin v. Mt. Sinai, 186 F.R.D. 293, 
305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1994); Rothschild v. 
Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 271. Liability is not the sole force driving this concern; another is the realization that 
awareness of other people’s cultures and beliefs actually assists the doctor in delivery of 
medical services. This realization is beautifully illustrated in a book about the collision be-
tween Hmong culture and American medicine: the doctors see epilepsy in a little girl, while 
her family regards her as giving expression to a higher spirituality—a spirituality not to be 
tampered with by drugs. See ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL 
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 Medical service providers, judges, and lawyers face a unique chal-
lenge in devising ways to ensure effective communication access—a 
right guaranteed by law—between Deaf patients and their medical 
care providers. Such thinking cannot take place in a vacuum; rather, 
a conversation between doctors and patients needs to take place and 
the law needs to do its part to make that conversation happen in the 
medical office, not the courtroom. When the conversation does move 
into a courtroom, the deference to a Deaf patient’s express choice of 
auxiliary aid should lead to a rebuttable presumption that the pa-
tient’s choice is what is required for effective communication. The 
burden of proof would then shift to the doctor to prove that a differ-
ent kind of auxiliary aid would yield equally effective communication 
and would not impose as much of a financial burden on the doctor. 
 The courts need to recognize, too, that the statutes, regulations, 
and case law mistakenly characterize the auxiliary aid as existing 
solely for the deaf patient. Instead, the auxiliary aid for a Deaf pa-
tient, however, is better visualized as either a two-way street or a 
bridge. Whether it is a sign language interpreter, written notes, or 
CART transcription, the auxiliary aid serves the needs of both the 
Deaf patient and the doctor. Just as the Deaf patient needs the auxil-
iary aid to access the doctor, the doctor needs the auxiliary aid to ac-
cess the patient. The auxiliary aid serves to facilitate the communi-
cation between both parties, and both parties need the bridge in or-
der to communicate effectively with each other.  
 Inspired by the disability rights movement, which has brought 
about great changes in American society, and the passage of Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990, people with disabilities have become more visi-
ble in the American mainstream. This reflects changes not just in 
law, but also in social attitudes, public policy, and government pro-
grams.272 Deaf and hard-of-hearing people have increasingly been 
demanding effective communication access in various forums: educa-
tion, health care, employment, places of public accommodation, and 
transportation. The growing presence of this new “minority” in soci-
ety poses challenges not just for medical providers who need to take 
care of their health care needs, but also judges and lawyers who are 
called upon to resolve disputes over how well medicine—as well as 
                                                                                                                     
DOWN: A HMONG CHILD, HER AMERICAN DOCTORS, AND THE COLLISION OF TWO CULTURES 
(1997). 
 272. REBECCA CORY ET AL., SYRACUSE UNIV. CENTER ON HUMAN POL’Y, INTRODUCTION 
TO BEYOND COMPLIANCE: AN INFORMATION PACKAGE ON THE INCLUSION OF PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION (2003), available at 
http://thechp.syr.edu/BCCC_PACKAGE.HTML#INTRODUCTION. 
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the rest of society—handles their communication needs.273 And be-
cause of the disability rights movement, which has been so influen-
tial in expanding transportation, housing, and employment options, 
people with disabilities, including Deaf people, see their personal sit-
uations as political issues.274 
 In short, there is a moral argument and a practical argument. In 
moral terms, requiring a doctor to consult with a Deaf patient and to 
give the patient’s choice of auxiliary aid due deference, or “primary 
consideration,” is an expression of the humanistic and progressive 
values that drive enforcement of the ADA: inclusion and integration 
of people with disabilities in the mainstream of American life. In 
practical terms, mandating a conversation between doctor and pa-
tient may operate to reduce litigation and preserve judicial resources. 
When people talk and listen to one another, it reduces the chance 
they end up in court. 
                                                                                                                     
 273. The concept of “beyond compliance” was pioneered by the Beyond Compliance Co-
ordinating Committee (BCCC), a group of students at Syracuse University “who are work-
ing to create and support a positive climate toward disability that values individual differ-
ence in all University settings.” Beyond Compliance Coordinating Committee (BCCC), 
http://bccc.syr.edu (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). According to the BCCC, 
Disability is more than just a physical, sensory, cognitive or mental impair-
ment. Accessibility is more than just compliance with federal and state laws. 
Disability is about the human condition, and the Syracuse University commu-
nity will be enhanced by a broader conceptualization of disability that calls for 
inclusion, equality, and social justice. Thus, compliance with the law is the 
starting point, not the bottom line, for the University community. 
Beyond Compliance Coordinating Committee (BCCC), http://bccc.syr.edu/bccchistory.htm 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008). A “beyond compliance” mindset is one of inclusion—inclusion 
of the person with a disability in the community regardless of the cost. Indeed, a cost-
benefit analysis is inapplicable because it contravenes the value of inclusion and integra-
tion. Thus, the question becomes, “What will it take to include the person with a disabil-
ity?” and not “How much will this cost me?” or “What is in this for me?” The answer is to 
look at a variety of auxiliary aids that can be drawn upon according to need. 
 274. CORY ET AL., supra note 272; see also C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL 
IMAGINATION 226 (1959): 
Know that many personal troubles cannot be solved merely as troubles, but 
must be understood in terms of public issues—and in terms of the problems of 
history-making. Know that the human meaning of public issues must be re-
vealed by relating them to personal troubles—and to the problems of the indi-
vidual life. Know that the problems of social science, when adequately formu-
lated, must include both troubles and issues, both biography and history, and 
the range of their intricate relations. 
